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COMMENTS
REEVALUATING THE SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSAL RULE IN THE WAKE OF CRACKER
BARREL AND THE ERA OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS
Christine L. Ayotte+
Since the corporate principles of ownership and control first were iden-
tified, the scope of corporate accountability has been debated continu-
ously.1  The philosophy underlying corporate accountability is that
shareholders are the true owners of a public corporation, but the every-
day control and management of a corporation resides with the board of
directors and appointed managers Charged with the duty of protecting
investors,3 the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission" or
+J.D. Candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See Kenneth R. Propp, The SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule: Corporate Ac-
countability at a Crossroads, 11 SEc. REG. L.J. 99, 117 (1983) (noting that the debate re-
garding the assumptions of accountability of corporations began in the 1930s and has con-
tinued for more than 50 years); see also Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and 13D and
the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 376, 376
(1992) (noting that the debate over corporate governance began with Berle & Means's
theories of separation of functions and has continued ever since).
2. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-20 (1932). There have been two primary
justifications for the belief that corporations should afford primacy to the shareholders.
See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223,230-31 (1991). Berle &
Means advocated the first justification, which is premised on a theory of trust and prop-
erty. See id. at 230-31. They hypothesized that a trust relationship existed between share-
holders and management, "with management holding the shareholders' property in trust
for their benefit." Id. at 231. The second, more recent theory, is governed by contractual
relations. See id. The advocates of this theory see the players in the corporation, both
management and shareholders, as actors in the market governed by a "contractual order-
ing." Id.
3. The Commission is authorized to make and enforce all rules and regulations it
deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994); see also WILLIAM
L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
258 (6th ed. 1988) (stating that the purpose of the 1934 Act is to provide protection to in-
vestors ensuring "fair and orderly securities markets"). Congress gave the SEC broad
power to develop rules to encourage shareholder participation. See S. REP. NO. 73-792 at
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"SEC") enacted the Shareholder Proposal Rule in 19424 ("Rule" or
"Rule 14a-8") to ensure shareholder participation in the important deci-
sions of the corporation. The SEC intended the Rule to guarantee man-
agement's accountability to the shareholders, the true owners of the cor-
poration.' The driving force behind the Rule was the notion that
shareholders did not have adequate or efficient means of participation in
corporate governance.7 The SEC envisioned the Rule as a major step
toward increased shareholder participation in corporate decision making
and a method to further promote corporate accountability.8
Since its enactment, the Rule has been a relatively ineffective mecha-
nism for shareholders to participate in the decision making process of a
corporation. Among the Rule's many exceptions, the most controversial
12 (1934). "Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity
security bought on a public exchange." H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
4. Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, 7 Fed.
Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (Dec. 22,1942), available in 1942 WL 6346, at *10-11 (S.E.C.) (Dec. 18,
1942) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
5. See Shareholder Proposal Rule, 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1998); Solicitation of
Proxies Under the Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, 7 Fed. Reg. at 10,659 (listing
disclosure requirements for business combinations). Taken as a whole, the intent behind
the Shareholder Proposal Rule is to ensure shareholders an avenue for active participation
in corporate governance. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 14 (1934) (discussing the intent of
the 1934 Act to protect investors). The addition of Rule 14a was pursuant to the goals
enunciated within the House Report. See Solicitation of Proxies Under the Rule, Ex-
change Act Release No. 3,347, 7 Fed. Reg. at 10,655 (stating that the legislation is pursu-
ant to the authority granted under the 1934 Act); see also Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate
of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 555
(1957) (arguing that the Shareholder Proposal Rule gives shareholders an opportunity to
influence the decisions of management).
6. See Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, 7
Fed. Reg. at 10,655 (stating that the Commission was acting pursuant to the powers and
goals of the 1934 Act); see also H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 14 (1934) (stating that a purpose
behind the 1934 Act was the "duty of according shareholders fair suffrage," to ensure
shareholder participation in corporate governance); see also Freeman, supra note 5, at
549-50 (explaining that Rule 14a-8 provides a mechanism whereby shareholders are made
aware of proposals and the proponents' reasons for submitting the proposals, and are
given an opportunity to vote on the proposal); Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, An
Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule, 65 GEO. L.J. 635, 636-37 (1977) (argu-
ing that without the leverage the Act provided, management would not listen seriously to
shareholders' proposals).
7. See Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, 7
Fed. Reg. at 10,655 (discussing the authority and the purpose behind the legislation); see
also H.R. REP. No. 73-1383 (1934) (same).
8. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 14; Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Ex-
change Act Release No. 3,347, 7 Fed. Reg. at 10,656.
9. See Howard B. Adler, The Emerging Role of Activist Shareholders and Destabi-
lizers, in THE NEW AGGRESSIVE ERA IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS at 133, 135 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-992,
1996) (arguing that due to the limited means of communication afforded to shareholders,
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is Rule 14a-8(c)(7), the ordinary business exception ("ordinary business
exception"),' which allows management to exclude shareholder propos-
als on a broad range of topics," so long as the company shows that the
proposal relates to its ordinary business operations.12 The amorphous
language of the ordinary business exception has sparked much debate
and litigation."
proposals have resulted in few substantive changes); see also Michael J. Connell, Share-
holder Proposals, in PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 1997, at 397,
399 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-970, 1997) (noting that, until
1976, the Shareholder Proposal Rule was not frequently used and received little attention
from corporations and shareholders alike).
One scholar, however, argues that the success of the Rule should not be evaluated in
terms of the results that the proposal brings, but by whether the shareholder is provided
an opportunity to hold management accountable. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 555.
Freeman, one of the architects of the Shareholder Proposal Rule, explained his view as
follows:
As we have seen, a stockholder almost never wins his point on a showdown
vote at a meeting. However, by forcing the management to a public defense of
its position, the shareholder may contribute to a better understanding between
management and shareholders. In some cases he may even cause a reappraisal
by management of some aspects of its position.
In judging the value of the stockholder proposal rule, I believe it is of no con-
sequence whether a stockholder ever prevails or whether a management ever ac-
cepts a stockholder's proposal. The value which I see in the rule is that to the ex-
tent that stockholders challenge the judgment of management, management is
required to make a defense of its position.
Id.
10. Shareholder Proposal Rule, 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1998). The exception
states that a proposal may be excluded from a proxy statement if it "deals with a matter
relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the registrant." Id.; see also
Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regula-
tion, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 890 (1994) (noting that the ordinary business exception is one
of the most used and litigated grounds for exclusion of shareholder proposals).
11. See Grimes v. Ohio Edison Co., 992 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a
shareholder proposal that sought to cap annual capital or construction expenditures at
$300 million without prior shareholder approval was excludable under 14a-8(c)(7)); Roo-
sevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding a
proposal requesting the phase-out of chloro-fluorocarbons excludable because the com-
pany already had a phase-out plan that was to take place "as soon as possible").
12. See Shareholder Proposal Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7).
13. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp 858, 861-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in part 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995) (granting an injunction to include a
proposal that called for implementation of a policy prohibiting sexual-orientation dis-
crimination at Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. ("Cracker Barrel")); Amalgamated
Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y.
1993). The Amalgamated case dealt with whether a proposal advocating an affirmative
action policy could be excluded under the ordinary business exception. See id. at 879. The
Rule also has been the subject of many no-action letters. See, e.g., IBM Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1995 WL 765445 (S.E.C.), at *9 (Dec. 28, 1995) (proposal regarding em-
ployees' ability to provide services to unrelated companies); Marion Merrell Dow, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 93582 (S.E.C.), at *10 (Mar. 26, 1993) (proposal on the
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The Cracker Barrel litigation, for example, dealt with this exception.
In 1992, the Commission issued a no-action letter in response to Cracker
Barrel Old Country Store's notification of its intention to exclude a
shareholder proposal regarding non-discriminatory employment poli-
cies. 14 This matter resulted in litigation, ultimately upholding the SEC's
choice not to act.15 The Cracker Barrel decision signaled the Commis-
sion's retreat from the principle of corporate accountability. The Com-
mission changed its interpretation of what constituted ordinary business
in favor of corporate management's increased exclusion of shareholder
proposals. 6 The Commission's enunciated policy in Cracker Barrel led
to a severe limitation in the scope of shareholder proposals under Rule
14a-8 by excluding proposals pertaining to important social policy in em-
ployment related issues.
17
While shareholder participation in corporate governance 8 has been
scope of employees' responsibilities); Eastman Kodak Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991
WL 176584 (S.E.C.), at *6 (Jan 30, 1991) (procedures for employee-management commu-
nications).
14. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,418, at 77,287 (Oct. 13, 1992) [hereinafter
Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter].
15. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
16. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 14, at 76,419; Abbott A. Leban
& Jennifer Heller, Second Circuit Rules in Favor of SEC in Cracker Barrel, INSIGHTS,
Mar. 1995, at 28, 30 (arguing that the effect of the ruling will be to force shareholders with
proposals regarding corporate and social responsibility to "pursue other means to attain
their goals"); see also, Herbert Alan Gocha Jr., The 1980's Amendments to Shareholder
Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Final Damper on Dissent?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 411, 440 (1986)
(concluding that the Commission continuously has created a barrier to shareholder access
to proxy materials). The Commission has continually diminished shareholder participa-
tion and the decision in the Cracker Barrel matter was simply another barrier restricting
the proper subjects for shareholder proposals.
17. See, e.g. Price/Costco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 604162 (S.E.C.) at
*14 (Oct. 21, 1996) (proposal dealing with the hiring or retention of a board member be-
cause of his or her being adjudged or convicted of insider trading was excludable because
it dealt with employee qualifications); Dayton Hudson Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996
WL 107267 (S.E.C.), at *14 (Mar 12, 1996) (citing a proposal calling for the company to
prepare a report detailing the companies equal employment practices was voidable be-
cause it dealt with employment related issues); Ford Motor Company, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1996 WL 94836 (S.E.C.), at *6 (Mar. 4, 1996) (finding excludable a proposal that a
company not use race, religion or sex as a means of discriminating against or giving pref-
erential treatment to employees because it dealt with employment related matters).
18. One definition of "corporate governance" that has been advanced defines it as
the legal and practical system for the exercise of power and control in the con-
duct of the business of a corporation, including in particular the relationships
among the shareholders, the board of directors and its committees, the executive
officers, and other constituencies (such as employees, local communities, and
major customers and suppliers).
Warren F. Grienenberger, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, in
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limited,'9 the traditional justifications for these limitations are no longer
justified in light of changes in the characteristics of shareholders. ° Today
an increasing number of shareholders are institutional investors 21 An in-
PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 1992, at 171, 173 (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 765, 1992). A second definition that the California
Public Employees' Retircment System, an institution investor, has advanced defines "cor-
porate governance" as "the 'relationship among various participants in determining the
direction and performance of corporations,"' with the primary participants being, share-
holders, company management, and the board of directors. Kayla J. Gillan, CalPERS -
Corporate Governance: Planning for the 21st Century, in Vital Speeches, May 15, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 10024422 [hereinafter CalPERS Speech].
19. See Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and the Market for Corporate Control, 70
WASH. U.L.Q. 755, 755 (1992) (noting that "[t]he standard form for publicly held corpora-
tions provides shareholders with very limited powers"). Further, the courts sometimes
have invalidated the shareholders' efforts to empower themselves with greater influence.
See, e.g. Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 417, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (upholding Du Pont's exclusion of a shareholder proposal regarding the company's
use of chloro-fluorocarbons); Jansky v. Miller, 474 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding
the corporation's exclusion of a "personal feud-type" proposal); New York City Employ-
ees' Retirement Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 795 F. Supp. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing
shareholders who sucessfully sought an injunction requiring Dole Foods to include a pro-
posal regarding national health care), vacated, 969 F.2d 1430, 1435 (2d Cir. 1992); Brooks
v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (upholding Standard Oil's ex-
clusion of a proposal under the pre-1976 "general economic or political cause" exclusion);
Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp 679, 680-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (avoiding resolution of
the dispute over a proposal by finding that plaintiff had not exhausted administrative
remedies).
20. See Institutional Voting Research Service Client Advisory Letter, in
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTIVIST OWNERS at 33, 34 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 704, 1990) (stating that "[c]oncentrated
ownership has given rise to a new form of corporate governance whose ultimate shape and
structure has yet to be fully defined"); see also HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL
WOLFF, 3D SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW 13-74 (1997) (noting that an
increasing number of institutional investors have complained that the federal proxy system
has created a barrier to their participation in corporate governance); Lynne L. Dallas, The
Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (noting that
"[t]he current system of shareholder voting rights is inadequate to meet the needs of the
modern corporation"); James A. White, Shareholder-Rights Movement Sways a Number of
Big Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1991, at C1 ("The solid wall of corporate opposition
to shareholder-rights proxy measures is beginning to crumble, as big pension funds win
concessions from an unprecedented number of large companies."); infra Part I.B (dis-
cussing the shift from individual shareholders to institutional investors).
21. See Richard H. Koppes & Kayla J. Gillan, The Shareholder Advisory Committee,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1991 at 29, 29-30 (noting that the number of institutional
investors is growing and will continue to grow.) This growth will result in a shareholder
group that is different from the traditional shareholder group. See id.; see also Robert A.
Kindler & Rachel R. Gerstenhaber, Shareholder Initiatives, Institutional Investors and the
SEC: 14A-8 Proposals and the New Proxy Rules, in 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION at 9, 15 (PLI Corp. L & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-793, 1992) (noting that institutional investors recently have increased their share of
holdings). Institutional investors now hold an estimated fifty-three percent of outstanding
equity shares. See id. at 17; Grienenberger, supra note 18, at 175-77 (discussing institu-
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stitutional investor, unlike an individual investor, is a corporate entity
such as an insurance company, a pension fund, or similar institution that
22invests in stock to make profits for its venture.
The changes in the fundamental identity characteristics of corporate
investors has increased the potential for meaningful shareholder partici-
pation in corporate governance;23 and it has prompted the need for re-
evaluation of the Shareholder Proposal Rule and in particular its excep-
24tions. A new attitude of shareholder activism has emerged that views
the principal corporate goal as the maximization of shareholder value in
the corporation.2 ' The Commission recently has recognized the changes
in corporate structure, the nature of investors, and prevailing attitudes
and has realized the need to reevaluate the current Shareholder Proposal
26Rules to reflect those changes.
This Comment explores the history of the Commission's Shareholder
Proposal Rule and focuses on the ordinary business exception. This
Comment traces the history and purpose of the Rule in light of the goal
of corporate accountability to shareholders. Part I focuses on the inef-
fectiveness of the Shareholder Proposal Rule to obtain its stated goals
and the role of the Commission in hindering the achievement of corpo-
rate accountability. It analyzes the revisions of the Rule and the Com-
mission's struggle to define what constitutes a "proper subject" or "ordi-
tional investors, their increased presence, and current problems associated with corporate
governance); see also Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and
Corporate Democracy, 23 GAL. REV. 97, 103 (1988) (noting that, due to the rise of insti-
tutional investors, "the traditional debate about shareholder proposals has become some-
what dated"). The increased presence of the institutional investor provides an opportu-
nity to reexamine the Shareholder Proposal Rule and its future application. See id. at 103-
04.
22. See Louis Lowenstein, Why Managements Should (and Should Not) Have Respect
for Their Shareholders, 17 J. CORP. L. 1, 3-6 (1991) (discussing the successful investment of
Dupont in GM during the first half of the century as an example of an institutional inves-
tor and the benefits that flow to both investor and company).
23. See Joseph Evan Calio & Rafael Xavier Zahralddin, The Securities and Exchange
Commission's 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions of Accountability, 14 PACE L. REV.
459, 480 (1994) (noting that "[ijnstitutional investors [are] no longer satisfied with being
silent parties" and simply collecting the profits, thus, they are calling for increased partici-
pation in corporate governance).
24. See infra notes 179-286 and accompanying text (discussing the factors creating a
need for reevaluation of the Rule).
25. See Adler, supra note 9, at 133 (advocating that traditional corporate goals of
"benefitting the corporation's community or its employees" should be subordinated to the
goal of maximizing shareholder value).
26. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm
Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1992) (citing
the need for redress of the corporate governance system to accommodate the evolution of
the modern institutional investors).
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nary business." Part II discusses the most recent interpretation of the
ordinary business exception in the Cracker Barrel case. It will then ex-
amine the impact of the Cracker Barrel decision on corporate account-
ability and discuss the importance of institutional investors in reevaluat-
ing the Shareholder Proposal Rule to assure corporate accountability to
shareholders. Next, it will explore the Commission's failure to adhere to
administrative procedures and its broad disregard for shareholders in
their role as monitors of the corporation. This Comment then will ana-
lyze the impact of the Shareholder Proposal Rule on the future effec-
tiveness of corporate accountability. Next, this Comment discusses the
new rule issued by the Commission which begins the necessary reevalu-
ation of the Shareholder Proposal Rule. In Part Ill, this Comment sug-
gests the need to redefine the ordinary business exception to provide
more guidance to shareholders and issuers alike. Part III also analyzes
the changes to the Shareholder Proposal Rule the Commission has issued
and the impact these changes are likely to have on corporate governance.
Although this Comment concludes that the Commission has taken a step
in the right direction, it argues that further revisions of the ordinary
business exception are necessary. Additional revisions should include
defined principles of application and guidelines, both for the protection
of shareholders and management.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SHAREHOLDERS' IMPORTANCE IN THE
CORPORATE STRUCTURE
The SEC has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations it
deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors."27 An underlying purpose for creating the Commission,
and its power to create rules relating to shareholders, was the assurance
of "[f]air corporate suffrage. 2 8 By enacting this regulatory scheme, Con-
gress sought to effect a new system of corporate governance that ac-
counted for the opinions of shareholders, the true owners of a corpora-
tion.29 The Commission implicitly is authorized to enforce regulations tocontrol the solicitation of shareholder proxies.3 ° This is an important task
27. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
28. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934). The legislative history behind the creation
of the Commission shows Congress's desire to afford shareholders certain rights that
would hold management accountable and create an incentive to engage in "[flair corpo-
rate suffrage." See id.
29. See id. The congressional intent in creating the Commission was focused on cre-
ating a regulatory agency that would help shareholders control the important aspects of
the companies they owned. See id.
30. See Propp, supra note 1, at 102 (noting that although the primary activity of the
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
for the Commission to undertake because of shareholders' power to
submit proposals to corporate management for inclusion in a corpora-
tion's annual proxy statement.
Distinguishing the shareholders' ownership of the corporation from
32management's control of the corporation is extremely important. Al-
though shareholders are entitled to submit proposals, they do not have
any control over the day-to-day operations of the corporation." The con-
trol of the corporation is vested solely in the officers and the board of di-
rectors who manage the company for the benefit of the shareholders. 34
Commission that Congress envisioned was regulatory, the Commission also would need to
control the conditions for proxies and shareholder proposals); see also DIVISION OF
CORPORATION FINANCE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., 2D.
SESS., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 143 (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter STAFF REPORT] (stating that it is consistent with the courts' broad interpreta-
tion of Rule 14a that the Commission has taken control of the proxy system to ensure
shareholders an adequate means of communication).
31. See Shareholder Proposal Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998). A shareholder
need only meet certain criteria to have a proposal included in the proxy statement. See id.
§240.14a-8(a). The shareholder must own at least one percent or $1,000 in "market value
of such voting securities of the registrant throughout the required one year period," and
must declare in writing that he intends to retain the securities at least through the date of
the scheduled meeting. Id. §240.14a-8(a)(1)(ii)(B)-(C). All of this information must be
documented with specified forms that the SEC regulates. See id. § 240.14a-8(a)(1)(ii); see
also Ronald M. Loeb & Henry Lesser, Some Recent Significant Developments in the SEC's
Shareholder Proposal Regulation, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 1992, at
327, 330 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 784, 1992) (noting that the
Shareholder Proposal Rule is essential to shareholder participation in corporate affairs
because it affords shareholders an avenue to voice their concerns at a minimal expense).
32. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 119-25 (explaining that the interests in
control and ownership of the company are often divergent and therefore it is important to
understand the separation of these functions).
33. See id. at 68-119 (pointing out the principal differences between those in a control
position and those who are owners of a corporation); GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING
CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL GOALS
SYSTEM 45-46 (1984) (stating that while shareholders want dividends, management would
rather retain earnings to permit growth without outside financing); Richard A. Booth,
Junk Bonds, the Relevance of Dividends and the Limits of Managerial Discretion, 1987
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 553, 553 (stating that shareholders' primary desire is a high return
on investment).
34. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 68-119. Berle and Means devel-
oped the theory of separation of ownership and control in great detail. See id. The roles
of stockholders and management are divergent and each has a particular function. See id.
at 119-25. Shareholders' interests include (1) earning maximum profits "compatible with a
reasonable degree of risk;" (2) receiving as great a distribution of dividends as possible
without encountering anything that may impair their rights to receive a share of the prof-
its; and (3) ensuring that the stock remains "freely marketable." Id. at 121. Management,
however, is motivated by its aims. If it is assumed that the prime motivation of manage-
ment is personal profits, then management's goals are going to diverge from shareholders
goals. See id. at 122. Management is willing to sacrifice the company's profit at the ex-
pense of the value of the stock. See id. Management may see it more beneficial to rein-
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Professors Berle and Means set forth the principle of separation of cor-
porate ownership and control in 1932,35 while at the same time articulat-
ing the inherent problems with this structure.36 Shareholders are consid-
ered "passive owners," which Berle and Means posited would lead toS 37
inefficiency throughout the corporation.
On the basis of Berle and Means's theories, the SEC determined that
shareholders needed some method of acquiring information about cor-
porations and participating in corporate governance.3 ' The Securities
Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") was passed to address matters such as the dis-
closure of corporate information to shareholders.39 The 1933 Act was the
first step in ensuring corporate accountability to shareholders throughsharholdr kowlege nd •• • 40
shareholder knowledge and participation. In 1934, the 1933 Act was
vest profits to enlarge its own power, and thus its interests would be counter to those of
the shareholders who desire a profit for themselves. See id. at 123-24. Interests between
management and shareholders also may diverge if management, "out of professional
pride," should decide to maintain labor standards above those practiced by competitors,
which reduce optimum profits for the shareholders. Id. at 124.
35. See George W. Dent. Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 881 (observing that Berle and Means "set forth the
thesis that corporate law's central dilemma has been the separation of ownership and con-
trol in publicly held corporations").
36. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 303-08 (Rev. ed. 1968). Berle and Means believed that share-
holders' passive ownership would lead to the inefficient use of corporate property. There
is less incentive for management to generate profit if those profits are to be passed on to
shareholders, the passive owners. See id. at 307; see also Dent, supra note 35 at 882 (as-
serting that the problems of corporate governance will not be solved until ownership and
control are united).
37. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 36, at 304-05. The problems with corporate
governance stem from the separation of those generating the profits from those receiving
the profits. See id. 304-06; see also Dent, supra note 35, at 882 (arguing that most observ-
ers concede that economic inefficiency results from the separation of ownership and con-
trol).
38. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 36, at 253 n. * (asserting that their original text
"became the foundation for the Federal legislation begun in 1933 and further developed
later"); George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of
Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 243-44 (1983) (asserting that The Modern Corpo-
ration influenced the passage of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933); see also Robert
Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON.
273, 279 (1983) (stating that Berle & Means helped to spark the federal disclosure laws).
39. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1994)).
40. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose behind the
the creation of the Commission in 1933); see also Gocha, supra note 16, at 412 (noting that
the Commission adopted the Shareholder Proposal Rule to allow shareholders to "voice
their opinions regarding governance of the corporation"); Palmiter, supra note 10, at 884
(asserting that the Shareholder Proposal Rule "breathes life" into the state law right of
shareholders to initiate corporate reforms through resolutions and by-law amendments).
The purpose of the Shareholder Proposal Rule was to legitimize the shareholder's voting
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supplemented with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which would
come to include the Shareholder Proposal Rule.4'
Shareholder proposals are the primary tools shareholders utilize to
present their opinions and concerns to the management of a corpora-
tion.42 Although shareholder proposals are recognized as a valuable tool
for shareholders,43 the Commission did not adopt a shareholder proposal
rule into the 1934 Act until 1942.44 Rule 14a-8 requires a corporation to
include in its annual proxy materials, and distribute to its shareholders,
all proposals shareholders present to a corporation. If the corporation
does not include the shareholder proposals, then the Commission has the
authority, through an enforcement action, to compel the corporation to
46include a proposal that meets all the substantive and procedural criteria.
The only restriction initially placed on this shareholder right was that the
proposal relate to a "proper subject" for shareholder consideration. 7
rights which would otherwise be ineffective due to the impediments to shareholder voting.
See id.
41 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994)).
42. See Thomas A. DeCapo, Note, Challenging Objectionable Animal Treatment with
the Shareholder Proxy Proposal Rule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 119, 138-39 (discussing how
shareholder proposals give shareholders the opportunity to influence the decisions of
management). The Shareholder Proposal Rule was adopted to provide shareholders an
opportunity to "express their views on issues affecting their corporation." Id. at 138; see
also Marilyn B. Cane, The Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System: Attitudes,
Results and Perspectives, 11 J. CORP. L. 57, 88 (1985). Cane recognizes that shareholder
proxy proposals are a significant way in which shareholders may voice their concerns to
management. Management, in turn, is under an obligation, according to Rule 14a-8, to
address shareholder proposals. See id.; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the
Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1970) (stating that the shareholder
proxy voting system is the primary tool for shareholder decision making in publicly held
companies).
43. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 6, at 635 (noting that shareholder proposals can
play a unique role in corporate governance and are "virtually the only device shareholders
can employ to influence corporate decisions").
44. See Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,655
(1942). The rule the Commission adopted was X-14A-7. See id.
45. See id. at 10,656.
46. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (1994). Within the
Act, Congress authorized
"[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is
about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of
this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder, . . . it may in its discretion bring
an action in the proper district court of the United States. .. ."
Id. See also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400, 406 (N.D.
I11. 1964) (interpreting the provisions of the 1934 Act to grant to the Commission the right
to enforce the rules promulgated for the protection of investors).
47. See Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3,347, 7
Fed. Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (1942); Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, The 1983 Amendments to Share-
[48:511
Reevaluating the Shareholder Proposal Rule
In granting shareholders this right, the Commission envisioned more
shareholder responsibility and participation in corporate activity. The
Commission, however, did not intend the Rule to become a consensus
device for shareholders on matters of social or economic policy and other
issues.49 This right was entirely consistent with the legislation's purpose
of conferring upon the Commission the power to promulgate rules neces-
sary and appropriate to safeguard investors. 0 The Rule was a major step
in restoring corporate accountability to shareholders."
However, the Shareholder Proposal Rule has not achieved its goal of
ensuring corporate accountability to shareholders. 2 The complicated
and convoluted history of the Rule has prevented the accomplishment of
that goal.
holder Proposal Rule 14A-8: A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 161,
167 (1984) (citing the "proper subject" limitation on disclosures). See generally Eric A.
Welter, Note, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Change to Certainty, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1980, 1982-84 (1992) (discussing the elements of the original rule and the definition
and limitations of the "proper subject" element).
48. See Sadat-Keeling, supra note 47, at 164 (noting that Rule 14a-8 was created to
address the issues of (1) "the need to hold large corporations and their managers account-
able to society for their actions;" and (2) "the proper role of the shareholder within this
,socially accountable' system of corporate governance"). Shareholders have used the Rule
to present proposals on many issues, especially dealing with public interest, "not generally
considered within the traditional purview of the business corporation." Id.; cf Gocha, su-
pra note 16, at 411 (recognizing that the inception of the Shareholder Proposal Rule
alarmed corporate managers).
49. See Sadat-Keeling, supra note 47, at 167-68 (noting that as the Rule allegedly was
being abused and used for purposes other than it was intended, the SEC started restricting
the shareholders' "privilege" of having proposals included in the proxy statement); see
also John G. Ledes, A Review of Proper Subject Under the Proxy Rules, 34 U. DET. L.J.
520, 522 (1957) (stating the reason the Commission advanced for the revisions was to curb
abuses of the rule "by persons seeking personal ends to the detriment of security holders
and the corporation").
50. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 14 (1934). Allowing shareholders a greater voice
in corporate governance was the goal of the legislation. See id. By granting shareholders
the right to include proposals in proxy statements, the Commission was acting in accor-
dance with its stated mandate. See id.
51. See Propp, supra note 1, at 115 (citing from the SEC's staff report on corporate
accountability that the Shareholder Proposal Rule is a democratic tool for shareholders).
The Rule evidences the concern about "'legitimacy and the need to subject management
to checks and balances'; it is a 'means of questioning a management which otherwise
might tend to become self-seeking, ingrown and autocratic."' Id.
52. See generally Colleen D. Ball, Comment, Regulations 14A and 13D: Impediments
to Pension Fund Participation in Corporate Governance, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 175 (arguing
that the Shareholder Proposal Rule impedes, rather than facilitates, shareholder participa-
tion). The repeated revisions of the Rule also evidence the failure of the Rule to attain its
stated goals.
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A. The History of the Shareholder Proposal Rule
1. 1948-1976: The "Proper Subject" Debate
The Rule, as initially promulgated, did not address what was consid-
ered a "proper subject" for shareholder consideration. 3 This deficiency
led to serious confusion 4 and ultimately to major revisions of the Rule."
In 1948, the Commission made its first revision to Rule 14a-8(c).56 This
revision restricted the ability of shareholders to include proposals in1 7
proxy materials. The Commission for the first time explicitly addressed
what constituted a "proper subject" for a proxy statement," by issuing a
policy statement setting "proper subject" guidelines. 9 The Commission
stated that the purview of what constituted a "proper subject" was more
appropriately left to the discretion of the individual states in accordance
with state law.6° Although the decision was left to the states, the Com-
53. Welter, supra note 47, at 1983 n. 19 (citing David C. Bayne, S.J., The Basic Ra-
tionale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DET. L. 575, 591 (1957) (recognizing that the initial ver-
sion of the Rule "contained no limitation whatsoever upon the shareholder as to what was
proper for proposal at the annual meeting")).
54. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 6, at 654-66 (discussing the Commission's at-
tempt to clarify what is a "proper subject" due to the lack of clarity in the original Rule).
55. See infra notes 56-112 and accompanying text discussing the evolution of the Rule
and historical amendments.
56. See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
4185, 13 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679 (Nov. 13, 1948) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), avail-
able in 1948 WL 3851 (S.E.C.); see also Cane, supra note 42, at 62 (noting that the Com-
mission has amended Rule 14a-8 several times since its promulgation); supra Part L.A (dis-
cussing the evolution and revisions of the Shareholder Proposal Rule).
57. See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
4185, 13 Fed. Reg. 6678, 6679 (Nov. 13, 1948) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), avail-
able in 1948 WL 3851 (S.E.C.) (permitting corporations to exclude shareholder proposals
if they were not comprised of "proper subjects"). See generally Ledes, supra note 49, at
520-27 (providing a thorough discussion of the "proper subject" element of the Rule).
58. See Letter of the Director of the Corporation Finance Division Relating to Sec-
tion 20 and to Rule X-14a-7 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-3638, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,990, 10,995 (Sept. 27, 1946), available in 1945 WL
700 (S.E.C.).
59. See id. The Commission stated:
Speaking generally, it is the purpose of Rule X-14A-7 (17 CFR, 240.14A-7) to
place stockholders in a position to bring before their fellow stockholders matters
of concern to them as stockholders in such corporation; that is, such matters re-
lating to the affairs of the company concerned as are proper subjects for stock-
holders' action under the laws of the state under which it is organized. It was not
the intent ... to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockhold-
ers with respect to matters which are of a general political, social or economic na-
ture. Other forums exist for the presentation of such views.
Id.
60. See id. (indicating that the Commission believed that definite principles of state
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mission emphasized that shareholder proposals were not meant to be a
tool for addressing general "political, social or economic matters., 61 The
Commission reiterated that these rules were designed to allow individual
shareholders to bring matters concerning the corporation to the attention
of fellow shareholders.62
The Commission's attempt at a definition of a "proper subject" for
shareholder proposals was vague and resulted in continuing problems.
The Third Circuit addressed this issue in SEC v. Transamerica Corp. ,63
the sole enforcement action that the Commission brought to compel in-
clusion of a shareholder proposal. The shareholder proposal at issue in
Transamerica advocated a repeal of a corporate by-law that gave com-
plete discretion to the directors to exclude a proposed by-law amend-
ment from shareholder meetings.64 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit agreed with the Commission that the definition of a
"proper subject" was to be determined under state law, affirming the
Commission's interpretation.6 ' Transamerica legitimized the use of state
corporate law were the best measures of what would constitute a "proper subject" for
shareholder consideration).
61. See id. The Commission issued this interpretation of the Rule in reply to a letter
inquiring whether shareholder proposals that proposed that shareholder dividends not be
subject to federal income tax where the income source of these dividends already had
been subject to federal taxation of the corporation. See id. The proposal further asserted
that the antitrust laws be revised. See id. The Commission held that this proposal was of a
political and economical nature outside of the realm of a "proper subject" for shareholder
proposals. See id.
62. See id. The Shareholder Proposal Rule was a means of opening the lines of com-
munication to individual shareholders who traditionally had trouble organizing and, there-
fore, had little impact on the affairs of corporate governance. See Beth-ann Roth, Proac-
tive Corporate-Shareholder Relations: Filling the Communications Void, 48 CATH. U. L.
REV. 101, 114-17 (1998) (discussing the increased shareholder communication as a result
of the Shareholder Proposal Rule); see also Paul M. Neuhauser, Facilitating Shareholder
Communications, 17 J. CORP L. 213, 213 (1991) (noting that "[s]hareholder communica-
tion is critical" to the shareholder voting process and informed decisions); Vanecko, supra
note 1, at 378-79 (citing the inability of shareholders to organize and work together as one
of the reasons for the traditional lack of shareholder influence on corporations). See gen-
erally Mary McCue, Matching Perceptions to Reality: Communicating Effectively with
Shareholders, INSIGHTS Dec. 1994 at 22 (discussing the need for enhanced communication
in the overall corporate system).
63. 163 F.2d 511, 515 (3d Cir. 1947) (stating that this case would turn at least in part
on the interpretation of what is a proposal which is a proper subject for action by security
holders).
64. See id. at 513 & n.2, 516. The controversy in Transamerica stemmed from a
shareholder action to regain some control over the corporation from management. See id.
at 513. Management had discretion to exclude proposed by-laws from shareholder meet-
ings, thus excluding shareholders from voicing their opinions on the proposed amend-
ments, due to a provision in the corporate by-laws that blocked shareholders from voting
on any by-law amendment. See id. at 516.
65. Se id. at 514, 518.
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law to define the proper scope of shareholder proposals and limit federal
power over the proxy process.66
2. The Evolution of the Ordinary Business Exception of Rule 14a-8(c)
The next significant revision to the Rule signaled the beginning of a re-
67strictive trend of decreasing corporate accountability to shareholders.
This 1954 revision68 set forth the principle known today as the ordinary
business exception.6 ' This controversial amendment gradually led to fur-
ther revisions that permitted management to exclude shareholder pro-
posals that dealt with public policy issues.70 The Commission broadly de-
fined public policy matters to include economic, racial, and religious
issues.71  Further, this exception disregarded the express congressional
purpose of the Shareholder Proposal Rule: to enhance corporate govern-
ance by shareholders.72
In the early 1970s, consistent with the political and social climate of the
time, the controversy surrounding the ordinary business exception cen-
tered on shareholder proposals dealing with public policy issues.73 In re-
66. See id. The court's decision gave authority to management to look to state law to
determine whether a proposal had to be included or could be excluded.
67. See Virginia J. Harnisch, Rule 14a-8 After Reagan: Does it Protect Social Respon-
sibility Shareholder Proposals?, 6 J.L. & POL. 415, 415 (1990) (discussing the 1954 grounds
for automatic exclusion of shareholder proposals).
68. See Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No., 34-4979, 19 Fed. Reg. 246,
247 (Jan. 6,1954).
69. See id. The exception, as stated in 1954, authorized management to exclude pro-
posals from inclusion in proxy materials "[i]f the proposal consists of a recommendation or
request that the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct
of the ordinary business operations of the issuer." Id.
70. See DeCapo, supra note 42, at 140. The revisions allowed management to "omit
proposals that primarily promote general economic, political, racial, religious, social, or
similar causes (public policy proposals); proposals to enforce or redress a personal griev-
ance; and proposals relating to the company's ordinary business operations." Id.
71. See id.
72. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). The court in Medical Committee stated that the
Commission's interpretation of Rule 14a-8(c) may have violated the congressional intent
of the Rule, and that "[i]t is obvious to the point of banality to restate the proposition that
Congress intended ... to give true vitality to the concept of corporate democracy." Id.
73. See generally id. (disagreeing with the SEC's determination that a shareholder
proposal was within the scope of the ordinary business exception and thus excludable).
The exclusion of the shareholder proposal to discontinue the making of Napalm may have
been contrary to the congressional purpose of the legislation. See id. at 681. The Court
espoused its view that the proxy rules could not be used to isolate a "political decision"
from management, stating
[w]e think that there is a clear and compelling distinction between management's
legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in matters of day-to-da@ busi-
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sponse, the Commission again revised the Rule, for a short time allowing
shareholders a greater degree of participation in setting the policies of a
corporation, by authorizing shareholders to submit proposals on public
policy issues so long as the proposal fell within certain parameters. 4 This
revision allowed corporate management to omit proposals on the same
grounds as stated in 1954, but only if the proposals were not "signifi-
cantly related"75 to the company's business or if the shareholder re-
quested management action that was not within the control of the com-76
pany. The practical consequence of the Commission's interpretation
was a significant increase in shareholder proposals dealing with public
ness judgment, and management's patently illegitimate claim of power to treat
modern corporations with their vast resources as personal satrapies implement-
ing personal political or moral predilections.
Id.
The court remanded the case to the SEC for further consideration. See id. at 682; see
also Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM,
69 MICH. L. REV. 419, 425 (1971) (discussing Ralph Nader's comments that the Project on
Corporate Responsibility was beginning to submit proposals designed to "tame the corpo-
rate tiger"). Campaign GM was the first major contest of the social responsibility proxies.
See id. at 422-31 (discussing Campaign GM and its objectives.) A proposal that the Proj-
ect on Corporate Responsibility submitted to GM called for the inclusion of "additional
members on GM's board of directors: a female consumer expert, an environmental profes-
sor, and a black community leader." DeCapo, supra note 42, at 139. Management vigor-
ously opposed this proposal. See id. A second proposal called for the creation of a Share-
holder Committee for Corporate Responsibility, emphasizing the allegation "'that
corporate decision-making overemphasized profit concerns and neglected the social im-
pact of corporate activities."' Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 6, at 646. Again, manage-
ment opposed this proposal. See id. at 647.
74. Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-9784, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,178,
23,178-79 (Oct. 31, 1972) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). The Commission amended
Rule 14a-8 so that management could not omit proposals dealing with recommendations,
requests, or mandates regarding general economic, political, racial, religious, social or
other causes if it was 'significantly related' to the business of the issuer or was in the con-
trol of the issuer. See id. A proposal is not 'significantly related' to the business of a com-
pany if it relates to operations that account for less than five percent of the company's to-
tal assets, net earnings and gross sales, and is not otherwise significantly related to the
company's business. See Connell, supra note 9, at 407 (discussing the concept of "signifi-
cantly related"); see also DeCapo, supra note 42, at 140 (discussing the impact of the 1972
revisions in increasing the number of shareholder proposals submitted); Propp, supra note
1, at 107 (recognizing the change in the Commission's policy in 1972 as a result of the deci-
sion in Medical Committee).
75. Solicitation of Proxies, Exchange Act Release No. 34-9784, 37 Fed. Reg. at
23,178. The Commission, however, did not define what would constitute a proposal that
was "significantly related" to the company's business. See id.
76. See id. Therefore, as in the case where shareholders called for the end of individ-
ual federal income taxation of shareholder dividends, the company would be able to ex-
clude the proposal as one which was not within the power of the company to control. See
supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing a shareholder proposal advocating an
end to taxation of shareholder dividends).
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policy issues.77 The ramifications of this revision were apparent in the
1976 proxy season, in which there was a 537 percent increase from the
1972 season in shareholder proposals that dealt with public policy is-
sues.78 With this new interpretation, the Commission found it difficult to
determine which policy issues were "significantly related" to a company's
business and which were outside the exclusion exception.79
3. 1976-1992: The Commission Struggles to Redefine "Ordinary
Business"
The ordinary business exception proved to be more confusing than
helpful to investors, and the SEC realized the need to clarify the Rule.8°
In an effort to end the confusion surrounding the ordinary business ex-
ception, the Commission set forth a new two-pronged test in 1976.81 For
exclusion under Rule 14a-8(c)(7), the proposal must (1) "involve busi-
ness matters that are mundane in nature," 82 and (2) must not include
"substantial policy or other considerations., 83  This test added a new
facet to the evaluation of shareholder proposals.4 If a matter of ordinary
77. See Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18
GA. L. REV. 425, 431 (1984) (noting the increase in the number of shareholder proposals
dealing with public policy during the 1972-76 proxy seasons); see also Schwartz & Weiss,
supra note 6, at 657 (noting that "[t]he 1972 amendments ... set the stage for a dramatic
increase in shareholder proposals" dealing with policy and social issues).
78. The number of shareholder proposals dealing with public policy issues increased
from 6 to 332 in the 1972 proxy season. See Liebeler, supra note 77, at 431 (questioning
whether the increase in "public policy resolutions ... was primarily due to judicial devel-
opments, the SEC's 1972 amendments, or the political unrest of the times").
79. See id. (noting the SEC's difficulty in determining what was significantly related
and what was a personal grievance); see also Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 34-
12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Dec. 3, 1976). The Commission openly stated in this
release that it was having increasing difficulty in determining what was significantly related
to the corporation's business or what constituted a personal grievance. See id.
80. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998. This release was intended to
alleviate some of the confusion surrounding the question of what would constitute ordi-
nary business under the exception. See id.
81. See id. For an informative discussion on the two-pronged test, see Alan L. Dye &
Gregory W. Hair, Preparing for the Annual Meeting and Shareholder Activism, A.L.I.
A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL ED. (1996), available in SB09 ALI-ABA 349, *361 (discuss-
ing the elements and the impact of the two-pronged test).
82. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,998.
83. Id. In 1992, the Commission reversed this position, citing its difficulty in deter-
mining what constitutes a substantial policy issue as the reason for allowing exclusion of
these proposals. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 14, at 76,419.
84. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Ex-
change Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. at 52,994.
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business operations included a question of "substantial policy or other
considerations," then it no longer would be excludable under the excep-
tion.8 In declining to modify the exception further, the Commission re-
lied on historical evidence of the validity of the Rule and the ordinary
business exception. 8 The problem of what proposals a company auto-
matically could exclude persisted, however, even after this revision.
In the wake of these revisions, the Commission's Division of Corpo-
rate Finance released a report ("Staff Report") on the issue of corporate
accountability to shareholders." The Staff Report explored the problem
of distinguishing between a "personal grievance" and a proposal "signifi-
cantly related" to the business of the company. 8 The Staff Report rec-
ommended that the Commission reconsider the significantly related test
and its interpretation of the ordinary business exception."
The Staff Report also indicated that the underlying rationale for the
Commission's control over shareholder proposal rules was to ensure
"fair suffrage." 9 It noted that courts had reinforced this principle, most
notably in the case of Medical Committee for Human Rights v. Securities
and Exchange Commission.9' In that case, the court recognized that the
purpose of Rule 14a was to ensure that shareholders could exercise their
rights to control important decisions.9 Therefore, the court invalidated
85. See id. Any proposal that addresses a serious social and/or policy issue will no
longer be excludable under the ordinary business exception as long as that issue is "signifi-
cantly related" to the company's operations. See id.
86. See id. The Commission stated that in its view, the Rule had been successful in
the past and needed no further revisions to enhance its viability. See id.
87. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 29. The Division of Corporate Finance is-
sued this report after an investigation that was initiated to analyze the state of corporate
accountability to shareholders. See id.
88. See id. The Commission was having great difficulty delineating between what was
significantly related to the business of the company and what was a personal grievance.
See id.
89. See id. at 186, 202. Even though the Staff Report did not recommend extensive
changes to the Shareholder Proposal Rule, it recognized that the "significantly related"
test and the ordinary business exception were broad terms that should be reevaluated by
the Commission to promote shareholder activism. See id at 164,186, 202.
90. See id. at 141 n.21. The reason for the Commission's power over the proxy system
is to prevent the abuses that have denied shareholders a fair opportunity to vote and have
thereby eroded the principle of corporate suffrage. See id. The overall goal of fair corpo-
rate suffrage provides the source for the Commission's power over regulation of share-
holder proposals. See id.
91. See id. at 142 (reiterating the court's statement that the overriding purpose of 14a
is to ensure shareholders the right to control the important decisions of the corporation
which affect them as shareholders).
92. See Medical Comm. For Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir.
1970). The court went further to say that management is hardly more qualified to control
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the application of Rule 14(a) because it denied shareholders the right to
debate a "political" corporate decision.93 This precedent opened the
gateway for increased shareholder input in important corporate deci-
sions.94 The court emphasized that the underlying basis of these rights
stemmed from the premise that shareholders are the true owners of the
corporation.95 The court ultimately concluded that the Commission's in-
terpretation of the Rule was contrary to congressional intent and that the
shareholder proposal at issue was a proper subject for shareholder par-
ticipation.96 This new-found appreciation for shareholder participation,
however, was short-lived due to steps the Commission would take.
As a solution to this continuing problem, the SEC contemplated omit-
ting the Rule, but instead decided to keep the Rule intact with only slight
modifications. 97 In 1983, the Commission revised the Rule to restrict
shareholder access to a company's proxy statements. The Commission
granted companies permission to omit proposals requesting a report
from the issuer or a committee the issuer formed if the matters pertained
to the corporation's ordinary business.99 Previously, a corporation could
not exclude requests for such reports because a corporation does not
the important decisions of the corporation than the beneficial owners of the corporation.
See id.
93. See id; see also Propp, supra note 1, at 120 (discussing the impact of the Medical
Committee decision of striking down a "political" issue which therefore would be an issue
significantly related to a policy issue).
94. See Letsou, supra note 19, at 771-72 (noting that the 1976 amendments revised
the interpretation of the Rule no longer to be applicable to proposals that involve "sub-
stantial policy or other considerations").
95. See Medical Committee, 432 F.2d at 680-81.
96. See id. at 680-682. The court stated that
the clear import of the language, legislative history, and record of administration
of section 14(a) is that its overriding purpose is to assure to corporate sharehold-
ers the ability to exercise their right-some would say their duty-to control the
important decisions which affect them in their capacity as stockholders and own-
ers of the corporation.
Id. at 680-81.
97. See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091, 48 Fed.
Reg. 38,218, 38,218 (Oct. 26, 1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). There was discussion
from the SEC considering elimination of the Shareholder Proposal Rule completely. See
id. After much deliberation, however, the Commission decided to keep the Rule in a
modified state. See id.
98. See id.; see also Connell, supra note 9, at 399 (noting that the Commission revised
the Rule to create a balance whereby it would not unduly favor proponents and therefore
made more stringent the requirements for shareholders to include proposals in proxy ma-
terials).
99. See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091 at 38,221.
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prepare reports on such issues in the course of ordinary business.'0°
These amendments broadened the scope of shareholder proposals that
corporations could exclude.01 As a result, between 1983 and 1984, the
overall number of proposals shareholders submitted declined forty-two
percent' °2 and proposals dealing with public policy issues declined forty-
eight percent.'3 The Commission also issued no-action letters on sev-
enty-five percent of corporations' requests to omit shareholder proposals
for reports relating to ordinary business operations.'t As a result of
these amendments and the Commission's passive stance, shareholders'
ability to hold corporations accountable through proxy proposals de-
clined even further.1 °5 Limiting the scope of subjects for those proposals
ultimately led to decreased shareholder participation and corporate ac-
countability because shareholder participation is attained largely through
shareholder proposals.10 6 At this point, shareholders were hesitant to ex-
pend their time and energy submitting proposals to corporations that
were likely to precipitate a no-action letter from the Commission. 7
From 1976 to 1992, the Commission tried to promote shareholders'
understanding of what it considered a "substantial policy consideration,"
100. See id.; see also Sadat-Keeling, supra note 47, at 188 (citing the Commission's ex-
planation that the change in policy is to avoid the matters of form over substance, which
would allow sophisticated shareholders to bypass the exception by submitting their pro-
posals in the form of a report request).
101. See Commodity and Security Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1977). These
amendments resulted in additional conditions for shareholders to meet restricting the
scope of shareholder proposals. The 1976 amendment limited shareholders to two 300-
word proposals per year and added new grounds for exclusion, including action which
would violate state law, action that would violate the proxy rules, mootness, substantial
duplication, and specific dividend amount issues. See DeCapo, supra note 42, at 141 n.225.
Management now had a broader definition of the ordinary business exception under which
it could exclude shareholder proposals. With all these changes, however, the Commission
did not discuss the trouble in determining what was "significantly related to the company's
business." See id. at 141.
102. See Decapo, supra note 42, at 142 (noting that commentators attributed the de-
cline in the number of shareholder proposals submitted to the alterations in the SEC's
policy regarding Rule 14a-8).
103. See id. (arguing that it is very difficult to include public policy proposals in proxy
materials because the Shareholder Proposal Rule allows for omission of proposals on
various grounds); see also Cane, supra note 42, at 71-72 (discussing the overall decline in
shareholder proposals as a result of the 1983 amendments to the Rule).
104. See DeCapo, supra note 42, at 142.
105. See id.
106. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 6, at 635, (noting that "[s]tockholder proposals
play a unique role in the governance of large corporations," because they are virtually the
only way that shareholders can try to influence corporate decisions that affect them).
107. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing the decrease in the
submission of shareholder proposals after the amendments).
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that would render a proposal non-excludable.1°8 For example, the Com-
mission held that a proposal dealing with the elimination of an affirma-
tive action program fell outside of the ordinary business exception due to
the inherent, serious policy considerations in such a proposal.1°9
After the 1983 amendments, the SEC did not make any additional sub-
stantial revisions to the ordinary business exception for an entire decade.
The Commission retained the two-part test it set forth in the 1976 release
until 1992, when in a no-action letter, it reversed its own interpretation of
the Rule without much explanation or procedure." °
A new era of increased shareholder activism began in the early 1990's,
and in response, the Commission revised its,proxy rules affecting the
Shareholder Proposal Rule."' The stated purpose of this revision was to
rebalance the Rule in order not to favor registrants unduly in this new
era of increased shareholder activism.'
2
B. Change in the Characteristics of Shareholders: The Emergence of the
Institutional Investor
One of the primary reasons for increased shareholder activism begin-
ning in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the emergence of the institu-
tional investor."' Before the advent of the institutional investor, the lack
108. See American Telephone and Telegraph Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL
235275 (S.E.C.), at *15 (Dec. 21, 1988) (determining that a shareholder proposal dealing
with the elimination of an affirmative action program is not excludable under 14a-8(c)(7));
TRW Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67666 (S.E.C.), at *6 (Jan. 28, 1986) (denying
exclusion of shareholder proposal that dealt with policies of a company in Northern Ire-
land on the basis that they were serious policy considerations under 14a-8(c)(7)); Texaco
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 48457, at *18 (Feb. 28, 1984) (S.E.C.) (denying ex-
clusion of shareholder proposal regarding company policies, business dealings, and pres-
ence in South Africa on the basis on 14a-8(c)(7)). The proposal fell outside of the excep-
tion due to the serious policy considerations raised. See id.
109. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL
235275, at *14.
110. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 14, at 76,419.
111. See Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, 1992 WL 301258, at *3 (Oct. 16, 1992) (noting that "the proxy rules have created
unnecessary regulatory impediments to communication among shareholders and others
and to the effective use of shareholder voting rights").
112. See generally id.; see also Connell, supra note 9, at 399 (explaining that, although
the amendments were made to rule 14a-2(b), they were connected to solicitation of prox-
ies relating to a 14a-8 shareholder proposal).
113. See Kindler & Gerstenhaber, supra note 21, at 16-17 (noting that individual
shareholders historically failed to participate in corporate governance due to the related
costs, but that institutional investors are not so constrained and, as a result, are more ac-
tive participants); see also Adler, supra note 9, at 133-35 (indicating that recent share-
holder activism has been most pronounced by U.S. financial institutions and providing re-
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of adequate means of communication among individual shareholders and
the unresponsiveness to individual shareholder activism served as a bar-
rier to most shareholder participation in corporate governance."' His-
torically, it generally was unheard of for institutional investors to partici-
pate in corporate governance absent a significant likelihood of disaster."'
The traditionally passive role of institutional investors, however, began
to change in the 80s and 90s."6
As of 1992, institutional investors held an estimated fifty-three percent
of outstanding equity securities in the United States. 1 7 Major institu-
tional investors include pension and retirement plans, insurance compa-
nies, bank-managed accounts, mutual funds, and charitable endowment
funds."' These institutional investors understand the economic benefits
cent examples of the results of that activism); Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the
Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 80 (1990) (recognizing the ability of institutional
investors to "overcome collective choice and free-rider problems").
114. See Adler, supra note 9, at 135 (noting that factors including the relatively small
holdings of individual investors and the inadequate means of shareholder communication
resulted in few substantive changes); see also Vanecko, supra note 1, at 378-79 (discussing
the relative lack of shareholder participation before the emergence of institutional share-
holders due to the inability of individual shareholders to communicate and organize.) Va-
necko noted the relative lack of influence that individual shareholders have traditionally
had on corporations. See id.; see also Matheson & Olson, supra note 26, at 1315 (discrib-
ing shareholders' behavior in the past as "passive, impotent and unconcerned").
115. See Adler, supra note 9, at 135 (discussing the evolvement of shareholder activ-
ism).
116. See id. (noting that the corporate "landscape" has changed due to the increased
size and availability of mutual funds and increased market investments by institutions); see
also Cane, supra note 42, at 87 (discussing the shift in attitude about shareholder participa-
tion as a result of the increase in institutional holdings). Institutional investors began to
move away from the "Wall Street Rule": that if shareholders are not happy they should
sell their stock. Instead, institutional investors are holding onto their stock and taking the
time to participate in changing unattractive aspects of corporate governance. See Cane,
supra note 42, at 87; see also BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 20, § 13.10[1], at 13-73
(discussing the increased presence of institutional investors).
117. See Barbara Franklin, SEC Seeks Freer Speech: Shareholder Communications
Proposal Debated, N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1992, at 5; cf. Calio & Zahralddin, supra note 23, 476-
77 (noting that in aggregate, institutional investors "own more than $6.5 trillion in assets");
Dye & Hair, supra note 81, at *352 (discussing the increase in institutional investors hold-
ings of publicly held companies); J. William Robinson, Developing and Analyzing A Cor-
porate Shareowner Profile, in SHAREOWNER ACTIvISM: THE EMERGING ROLE OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, (PLI Corp L. & Practice Course Handbook Series), available
in 575 PLI/Corp 89, at *115-16 (1987) (stating that it is not uncommon for institutional in-
vestors to hold an excess of 50 percent of the outstanding voting stock of medium and
large corporations).
118. See Dye & Hair, supra note 81, at *351 (stating that there is no real consensus
about what constitutes an institutional investor; but listing those institutions considered
generally to fit the characterization).
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of holding their investments for the long-term."' Institutional investors'
shift in focus from short-term profits to long-term profitability has
sparked renewed shareholder activism and the need for a reevaluation
of the Shareholder Proposal Rule.
II. POST-1992: THE SEC REEVALUATES THE CONCEPT OF ORDINARY
BUSINESS
In the early 1990s, the Commission was faced with a request for a no-
action letter that ultimately led to a substantial change in the interpreta-
tion of the ordinary business exception.12 1 In 1991, and again in 1992, the
New York City Employees' Retirement System (NYCERS), an institu-
tional investor, sent a letter and proposal to the Cracker Barrel Old
Country Store ("Cracker Barrel") to be included in the company's proxy
materials.22  The proposal called for the company to "(1) implement
nondiscriminatory employment policies related to sexual orientation, and
(2) add explicit prohibitions against such discrimination to the Company
employment policy statement.' ' 23 NYCERS submitted this proposal in
response to both the firing of gay and lesbian employees and a January
1991 policy statement released by Cracker Barrel's human resource de-
partment that stated Cracker Barrel employees must demonstrate nor-
mal heterosexual values. 4 Although Cracker Barrel rethought this pol-
119. See Kindler & Gertenhaber, supra note 21, at 20 (noting that the increased return
on long-term investments have prompted institutional investors to become more active in
corporate governance); see also Calio & Zahralddin, supra note 23, at 477 (arguing that
due to the large holdings of institutional investors, and the resulting difficulty and poten-
tial harm in disposing of such holdings quickly, the Wall Street Rule no longer presents a
viable option for these investors). The institutional investor would face much difficulty in
trying to quickly or effectively free itself of the unwanted equity, while at the same time
saturating and significantly lowering the market price for those shares. See id.
120. See Kindler & Gerstenhaber, supra note 21, at 22-29 (discussing the range of
strategies institutional investors have employed to enhance corporate accountability).
121. See Cracker Barrel Request for No-Action Letter, supra note 14, at 76,418.
122. See Letter from Elizabeth Holtzman, Comptroller of NYCERS, to Dan Evins,
President, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, available in 1992 WL 289095, at *4 (June 12,
1992). NYCERS is the New York City Employees' Retirement System that is responsible
for the pension funds and retirement funds of New York City public employees.
123. Letter from Robert G. McCullough, Baker Worthington, Crossley, Stansberry &
Woolf, to Securities and Exchange Commission, Corporate Finance Division, available in
1992 WL 289095, at *1 (July 13, 1993).
124. See Letter from Paula L. Chester, General Counsel for New York City Employ-
ees' Retirement System, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corpo-
rate Finance, available in 1992 WL 289095, at *5 (July 30, 1992). The release stated in part
that
Cracker Barrel is founded upon a concept of traditional American values ... It is
inconsistent with our concept and values, and is perceived to be inconsistent with
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icy after protests, the company stated that in the future it would "'deal
with any disruptions in our units, regardless of the cause, on a store-by-
store basis.",125 When asked to clarify its employment policy, Cracker
Barrel's response was evasive; the president stated simply that the com-
pany was not discriminating.
2 6
In June 1991, Cracker Barrel fired three more gay men from a store in
Mobile, Alabama."' Cracker Barrel became the target of many gay and
lesbian organizations and, possibly in an attempt to mollify the critics,
the company declared at its annual meeting that it was an equal opportu-
nity employer but took no other action.' 28 In response to Cracker Bar-
rel's lack of action, NYCERS brought forth its proposal regarding sexual
129discrimination for inclusion in the annual proxy statement.
NYCERS cited in its resolution that gay and lesbian workers con-
tinually were discharged from employment on the basis of their sexual
orientation." NYCERS believed that the efficiency and production of
the company would suffer as a result of this practice. As a consequence
of lost patrons and profits, NYCERS believed that it would suffer as a-- 132
shareholder. NYCERS stated that, as beneficial owners of the requi-
site amount of stock, it expected the proposal to be included under Rule
14a-8 of the 1934 Act.33
those of our customer base, to continue to employ individuals in our operating
units whose sexual preferences fail to demonstrate normal heterosexual values
which have been the foundation of families in our society. Therefore, it is felt
this business decision is in the best interests of the company. On the basis of this
company policy, we understand that at least eleven workers were fired solely be-
cause they were Lesbian or Gay.
Id.
125. Id. at *6. Cracker Barrel did not rescind its employment policy nor rehire the
employees formerly discharged on the basis of their sexual preferences. See id.
126. See id. Mr. Evins, president of Cracker Barrel simply stated that Cracker Barrel
had acknowledged its mistake and apologized and that the company had no "morally dis-
criminating policies." Id.
127. See id.
128. See id. At the annual meeting statement, president Dan Evins announced that
Cracker Barrel was an "'equal opportunity employer that adheres to the letter and spirit
of the law regarding non-discrimination in the work place."' Id. Cracker Barrel, however,
refused to adopt a corporate policy to this effect. See id.
129. See id.
130. See Letter from Elizabeth Holtzman, Comptroller of NYCERS, to Dan Evins,
President, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, available in 1992 WL 289095, at *4 (June 12
1992).
131. See id. (arging that "employment discrimination on the basis of sexual preference
may deprive corporations of the services of productive employees, leading to less efficient
corporate operations).
132. See id.
133. See id. (NYCERS believed it had met all the criteria for submission of a share-
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A. The Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter - The Commission Makes a
Policy Change
One month after receiving the NYCERS proposal, Cracker Barrel re-
quested a no-action letter and informed the Commission of its intention
to exclude the proposal from the company's proxy materials under the
ordinary business exception.i' Cracker Barrel asserted that this proposal
affected the day-to-day issues of hiring policies, which fell within the
purview of the ordinary business exception, and therefore could be ex-
cluded from the proxy materials.'
On October 13, 1992, the Commission issued a no-action letter to
Cracker Barrel in connection with the NYCERS proposal.'36 The Com-
mission concluded that, although the proposal regarding the company's
hiring practices included substantial policy issues, the Commission was
having increasing difficulty in delineating what was includable and ex-
cludable based on social policy considerations. The Commission stated
further that it had reconsidered its interpretation and application of Rule
14a-8(c)(7)"'
Prospectively, the fact that a shareholder proposal concerning the gen-
eral workforce and practices of a company was tied to an important so-
cial policy would no longer remove the proposal from exclusion under
the "ordinary business exception."'' Instead, "the employment-based
nature of the proposal" would govern shareholder proposals.'9 In issu-
ing the no-action letter, the Commission took a position wholly inconsis-
tent with its previously established position.14 A proposal relating to an
important social policy would no longer mean the immediate exclusion of
the proposal; instead, the Commission would evaluate a proposal, in-
holder proposal).
134. Letter from Robert F. McCullough, Baker Worthington, Crossley, Stansberry &
Woolf, to Securities and Exchange Commission, Corporate Finance Division, available in
1992 WL 289095, at *3 (July 13, 1992).
135. See id. at *1; see also Letter from Robert G. McCullough, Baker Worthington,
Crossley, Stansberry & Woolf, to William E. Morley, Chief Counsel of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, available in 1992 WL 289095, at *15 (Aug. 11, 1992) (emphasizing
that matters related to day-to-day business decisions are excludable from a company's
proxy statement).
136. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 14, at 76,418.
137. See id. at 76,419.
138. See id. (noting that it would be easier to have a clearer line of what was includable
and what was excludable).
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See id. (noting that this interpretation was a change from its previous interpreta-
tion of the Rule).
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cluding such a policy issue, based on its relation to employment issues. 142
This decision was the Commission's last enunciation to date regarding
the shareholder proposal rules, and it served to further hinder the princi-
ples of corporate accountability to shareholders.43
In response to the no-action letter, NYCERS instituted an action
against the Commission in federal court.1" NYCERS alleged that the
Commission had violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),1 45 by
promulgating a new rule without complying with the APA's rule-making
146procedures. According to NYCERS, the Commission did not follow
the APA's required notice147 and comment 148 procedures when it promul-
gated the new rule.1 49 NYCERS argued that this new interpretation of
Rule 14a-8(c)(7) was a "rule" within the meaning of the APA"5° and
asked the court to issue an injunction against the Commission invalidat-
ing its new position.'
142. See id.
143. Since 1983, the Commission has made no formal changes in its interpretation of
the Rule with the exception of the 1992 no-action letter to Cracker Barrel.
144. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in part, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
145. 50 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (stating the procedures that must be followed in an ad-
ministrative rule making).
146. See NYCERS, 843 F. Supp. at 863.
147. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Section 553 (b) of the APA states:
General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or
otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall in-
clude-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
Id.
148. See id. § 553(c). Section 553(c) of the APA states:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After
consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in
the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
Id.
149. See NYCERS, 843 F. Supp. at 867. The court ruled that the SEC had amended a
prior legislative rule with the Cracker Barrel decision, thus requiring compliance with the
APA's procedures. See id. at 877.
150. See id. at 867 (arguing that the SEC promulgated "a new rule pertaining to an en-
tire category of shareholder proposals without first following the public notice and com-
ment requirements imposed by the APA").
151. See id. at 863. The NYCERS litigation is a good example of institutional inves-
tors not following the "Wall Street Rule" and fighting for the right to participate in corpo-
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The Commission argued that because NYCERS had an alternative le-
gal remedy, it was precluded from instituting a cause of action under the
APA."' The Commission also argued that it did not promulgate a
"rule" ' as defined under the APA, but only an "interpretation" that is
not subject to the APA's note and comment procedures. The Commis-
sion also denied that its interpretation was arbitrary or capricious and ar-
gued that it was completely consistent with the legislative purpose of the
rule. 155
The district court determined that the Commission had issued a rule in
the Cracker Barrel no-action letter.1 56 The court ultimately agreed with
NYCERS that the Commission failed to follow the mandatory APA pro-
cedures and issued an injunction prohibiting the SEC from taking any
position with regard to the ordinary business exception that would be in-
consistent with the provisions adopted in 1976.' 57 Finding that the Com-
mission had violated the procedures of the APA, the court found it un-
rate governance. See supra note 117 (discussing the "Wall Street Rule"). It is obvious
from the premise of the "Wall Street Rule" that NYCERS was not following this rule by
initiating litigation.
152. See NYCERS, 843 F. Supp at 866. The Commission argued that because
NYCERS could institute a suit directly against Cracker Barrel, they were barred from in-
stituting a cause of action under the APA. See id.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The APA defines a rule as "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy." Id.
154. See NYCERS, 843 F. Supp. at 866. The APA exempts interpretive rules from the
notice and comment procedures under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A); see also
infra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
155. See NYCERS, 843 F. Supp. at 866. The SEC argued that it had followed all of the
necessary procedures for the issuance of a no-action letter containing an interpretation,
not a new rule. See id.
156. See id. at 867. The court stated that Cracker Barrel "contains statements of gen-
eral applicability about how the employment-related proposal at issue was viewed by the
SEC and how the SEC intends to treat a broad range of similar proposals in the future."
Id.; see also id. at 881 (stating that the SEC did not seek "to interpret specific statutory or
regulatory terms" in fashioning its new position but instead "drew on its experience and
expertise to make new law"). The Court also noted that in prior instances, especially in
1976 when the Commission announced a new interpretation of a rule, the Commission
followed the correct notice and comment procedures. See id. at 877 (noting that the ordi-
nary business exception could not have been derived from an interpretation of the Share-
holder Proposal Rule, therefore, it was a legislative rule that needed a notice and com-
ment period).
157. See id. at 881-82; see also Leban & Heller, supra note 16, at 29 (discussing the de-
cision of Judge Wood, that the SEC had adopted a legislative rule that was subject to the
procedures of the APA); Simon M. Lorne, Recent Judicial Developments Under the Secu-
rities Laws, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 1995, at 757, 780 (PLI Corp. L.
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-902, 1995) (explaining Judge Wood's decision
that the SEC had promulgated a rule in the Cracker Barrel case).
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necessary to decide whether the Rule was arbitrary and capricious.'
8
The Commission was unsatisfied with the district court's decision and
appealed. " 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
Commission that the Cracker Barrel no-action letter was interpretive and
not a formal rule subject to the notice and comment procedures; there-
fore, the court vacated the injunction.'6 The court distinguished between
a legislative rule 6' and an interpretive rule.62 Unlike legislative rules, in-
terpretive rules are not subject to the APA's notice and comment proce-
dures.163 The court held that the Commission's no-action letter was in-
terpretive because the nature of all no-action letters is interpretive and
non-binding. The court realized that the Cracker Barrel no-action let-
158. See NYCERS, 843 F. Supp. at 881. The court's finding that the Commission vio-
lated the APA obviated the need for a finding on the merits of the arbitrary and capricious
claim. See id.
159. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir.
1995); see also Lorne, supra note 157, at 780 (stating that the Commission argued that its
actions were reasonable due to the Commission's inability to develop consistent principles
of what constitutes an ordinary business matter); Robert D. Tuke, Complying with Proxy
Rules: Living With the Springtime Ritual, in NUTS AND BOLTS OF SECURITIES LAW, at
371, 404 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-889, 1995) (noting that
the SEC had declined to issue no-action letters regarding the ordinary business exception
until the resolution of the Cracker Barrel case).
160. See NYCERS 45 F.3d at 13-14 (stating that the SEC action in the Cracker Barrel
matter did not constitute a legislative rule because the nature of no-action letters are non-
binding and "do not oblige or prevent action by the SEC, the parties, or the courts"); see
also Leban & Heller, supra note 16, at 28 (citing that the court found that no-action letters
are not subject to the rules of the APA). The court held that the no-action letter was not
binding; therefore, the fact that the SEC did not follow the notice and comment proce-
dures of the APA was not a violation. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 13-14.
161. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 12 (quoting White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir.
1993) ("'Legislative rules are those that 'create new law, rights, or duties, in what amounts
to a legislative act."')); see also Edward McGonagle, Administrative Law, 46 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 235, 249 (1995) (noting that although the court recognized that the no-action letter
in question "went beyond [a] garden variety no-action letter," no-action letters are, by
definition, not binding and therefore not legislative).
162. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 12 (quoting White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir.
1993), and explaining that an interpretive rule does "not create rights, but merely
'clarif[ies] an existing statute or regulation"'); see also McGonagle, supra note 161, at 248
(noting that the court deemed the Cracker Barrel no-action letter "an informal response"
by the Commission, not intended to bind any of the parties).
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (stating that the procedures required by the APA are
not applied to "interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organi-
zation, procedure, or practice"); see also NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 12; infra notes 164-165 and
accompanying text (discussing the APA).
164. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 12 (citing Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1994) for the proposition that no-action letters are
deemed informal responses because they do not bind the Commission, the courts or the
parties. Thus, a no-action letter is not legislative but interpretive in nature. See id.
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ter abandoned the Commission's established interpretation of the ordi-
nary business exception in the 1976 release, however, it refused to label it
a legislative rule because it had no "legal effect."'65
In addition, the Commission's rule was not reviewable as arbitrary and
166capricious in the eyes of the court. The important question of whether
the SEC actually followed the APA's statutory scheme has never been
fully answered. 67
B. Corporate Governance and Inapplicability of Traditional Justifications
to the Exclusion of Shareholders
There are many theories of corporate accountability, ranging from the
view that corporations have a social responsibility to the public, to the
view that corporations' sole responsibility is to maximize profits.'9 The
Cracker Barrel decision has rekindled the controversy surrounding cor-•• 169
porate accountability. In the wake of this decision, the question to
165. See id. at 13. The court stated that a no-action letter has no legal effect because
(1) it does not create a legal basis for an SEC enforcement action, (2) the SEC did not
publish the letter in the C.F.R. and (3) the SEC did not expressly invoke legislative
authority. See id. at 13 (citing American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health
Admin., 995 F.2d 1106,1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see also Subcommittee on Annual Review,
Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 51 Bus. LAW. 511, 561 (1996) (noting that
the court in Cracker Barrel "upheld the authority of the SEC to announce a new interpre-
tation of an agency rule in a no-action letter without first subjecting that interpretation to
notice and comment procedures.., of the APA").
166. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 14 (dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the no-action let-
ter was arbitrary and capricious); see also Subcommittee on Annual Review, supra note
165, at 563 (noting that the court declined to reach the merits of the arbitrary and capri-
cious claim against the Commission because NYCERS had the alternative legal remedy of
pursuing a direct suit against Cracker Barrel).
167. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 14 (stating that it did not need to answer this question
because NYCERS had an alternative legal remedy and the SEC had not created a legisla-
tive rule); see also Lorne, supra note 157, at 781 (recognizing that the court of appeals
never reached the merits of the Commission's position in the Cracker Barrel no-action
letter).
168. See Propp, supra note 1, at 117-20 (discussing different theories of corporate ac-
countability including the market control theory, government control theory, and share-
holder control theory); see also Peter F. Drucker, What is "Business Ethics"?, 63 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 18, 27 (1981) (arguing that it is the responsibility of business leaders to
exemplify ethical behavior); Arthur S. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the
Corporate Beast, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 86-88 (1979) (arguing that corporations' activity
should be classified as "state action"); Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., The Corporation as a Po-
litical Institution, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 59-61 (1979) (calling for an ethical approach to
market control).
169. See Leban & Heller, supra note 16, at 30 (stating that as a result of the Cracker
Barrel decision, shareholders will be forced to pursue other means to achieve their objec-
tives concerning corporate social responsibility); see also Karl A. Groskaufmanis & Mi-
chael J. Rivera, The Rhyme of Securities Litigation: 1993 Judicial Update, 8 INSIGHTS 8, 11
[48:511
Reevaluating the Shareholder Proposal Rule
whom corporations will be held ultimately accountable remains open.
1. The Impact of the Cracker Barrel Decision
Scholars continually have questioned the validity of maxim that a cor-S170
poration should be accountable to its investors. Conversely, the tradi-
tional justifications for limiting shareholder participation also have been
171rebutted. It is apparent, however, from the history of the Securities
and Exchange Act, that Congress expected shareholders to play a role in
the governance of corporations in order to increase corporate account-.. 172
ability. The Commission and its rules have continually diminished the
role that Congress envisioned for shareholders.17 ' The Commission's in-
terpretation of the exception in Cracker Barrel extended the trend to-
ward diminished shareholder participation174
(1994) (noting that the Cracker Barrel matter has become the latest source of controversy
surrounding the Shareholder Proposal Rule).
170. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53
VA. L. REV. 259, 261-62 (1967) (arguing that problems arise from the collective action of
shareholders who only own small amounts of stock); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 85 (1975)
(asserting that if management acts to maximize profits, it is acting in accordance with
shareholder expectations); Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of
the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 386 (1983) (arguing that no single ownership model is nec-
essarily the best for profit maximization); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1161 (1932). Dodd argues that profit maxi-
mization cannot be the goal of the corporation and instead it is necessary to take into ac-
count "the attitude of the public and business opinion as to the social obligations of busi-
ness." Id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 401 (1983) (arguing that costs of contracting make it impossible for
shareholder participation in corporate governance).
171. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
522 (1990) (asserting that shareholder participation is not as problematic as some critics
may urge); see also Dent, supra note 35, at 881-82 (1989) (noting the belief "that the sepa-
ration of ownership and control leads to economic inefficiency and mistreatment of share-
holders," thus the participation of shareholders is not troublesome, but necessary); Carol
Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate
Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379, 401-08 (1994) (ad-
vancing the argument that the "typical" shareholder has changed, and the perceived
problems of shareholder participation are no longer valid).
172. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for the crea-
tion of the Commission and ultimately the promulgation of the Shareholder Proposal
Rule).
173. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission's revi-
sions and the exceptions it created for proposals that need not be included in proxy mate-
rials that decreased shareholder participation).
174. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 14, at 77,287. The SEC effec-
tively further restricted the scope of permissive shareholder proposals by allowing the ex-
clusion of proposals which contained substantial policy issues. See id.; see also Leban &
Heller, supra note 16, at 30 (discussing the effect of the Second Circuit's ruling, allowing
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Cracker Barrel diminished the corporate accountability to sharehold-
ers need to effectuate legitimacy of the corporate structure.' The deci-
sion does little to reassure already skeptical shareholders that companies
will address their concerns seriously. ' This current policy is especially
alarming given the changing identity and nature of shareholders. The
new type of shareholder is the institutional investor.
2. The Era of the Institutional Investor
The nature of the corporate investor has changed immensely since
Congress promulgated the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 177 The era of institutional
investors has begun and the Commission must consider new factors to
ensure corporate accountability.
178
the SEC to issue no-action letters that further restrict the scope of shareholder proposals).
175. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 6, at 640 (noting that the legitimacy of man-
agement "rests upon accountability to and continued consent of the stockholders"); supra
note 106, (discussing the role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance); see also
Andrew J. Frackman & Achilles M. Perry, ACTWU v. Wal-Mart: Is this the Cost of Cor-
porate Democracy?, 9 INSIGHTS 2, 3 (1995) (noting that after the Cracker Barrel matter,
obtaining a no-action letter will no longer provide the assurances that it once did regarding
the position of the Commission and accountability to corporate shareholders); A. A.
Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance: The Search for Solutions, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 695, 710
(1992) (arguing that accountability is indispensable to corporate legitimacy). Sommer ex-
plains that "someone constrained to account for his or her conduct to someone who is
truly independent and able to replace management is likelier to strain for superior per-
formance." See id. The shareholders need to retain the power to remain independent and
remove insurgent managers from their positions. See id. Shareholders' rights are limited
even though the Commission has given them some "rights" to engage in corporate busi-
ness. See Letsou, supra note 19, at 759-73. While shareholders have the power to (1) re-
move a director for cause, (2) fill newly created directorships between annual meetings,
and (3) require corporations to issue certain types of reports, they do not have the "power
to direct the corporation's managers to make specific business decisions." Id. at 755, 760;
see also Barnard, supra note 113, at 38 (stating that the SEC has limited, or in some cases
excluded, shareholder participation).
176. See Barnard, supra note 113, at 38. The SEC has excluded some shareholders and
limited others from participating in corporate governance. See id. The SEC also has
failed to support shareholders and their initiatives. See id.
177. See Goforth, supra note 171, at 402-03 (noting that the pattern of stock ownership
has changed recently and institutional investors now account for ownership of "approxi-
mately one-half of the outstanding stock in public[ly held] companies"); see also Robinson,
supra note 117, at *108 (citing the recent change in the "mix" of investors to include a
great number of institutional investors); Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the
New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (1991) (noting that there has been
a marked shift from household investors to institutional investors).
178. See Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E. Korens, Trends in Institutional Share-
holder Activism: What the Institutions are Doing Today, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO AcTIvIST OWNERS, at 45, 47 (PLI Corp. L.& Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 704, 1990). "Institutional [investors] have focused on three courses
of action." Id. First, these investors are trying to facilitate communications with manage-
ment to increase their input in corporate affairs. See id. Second, they are attempting to
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As a result of the emergence of institutional investors,7 9 new alterna-
tives to shareholder control have become possible.80 The increase in the
number of institutional shareholders has decreased the number and
power of individual shareholders.18 Therefore, it is increasingly impor-
tant for institutional shareholders to have a broader range of influence in
corporate governance to assure corporate accountability.' 82 As a result,
the Commission must reevaluate shareholder activism in corporate gov-
ernance and the traditional justifications for limiting such activism. 181
enhance communication among all investors to ensure greater corporate accountability.
See id. Third, they are lobbying for congressional change to facilitate their input in corpo-
rate affairs. See id.
179. Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism? 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM. 117, 119 (1988) (noting that these institutions include "principally pension
funds, mutual funds, endowments, and stock ownership plans"); see also The Impact of
Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and the Capital Markets:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1989) (report of Dr. Carolyn Kay Brancato,
Institutional Investor Project, Columbia Center for Law and Economic Studies, entitled
"Institutional Investors and Corporate America: Conflicts and Resolutions"). The institu-
tional investors include pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, founda-
tions, and endowments. See id. With an institutional investor, the money will be invested
by an institutional investor and professionally managed, in contrast to individual share-
holders. See id.
180. See Conard, supra note 179, at 119 (advocating a system of "investor capitalism,"
whereby a number of institutions with large holdings could join together to create a new
system of control over management). See also Black, supra note 171, at 572-75 (arguing
that instiutional shareholders could monitor a campaign adequately, to ensure that the
company is protecting the best interest of the shareholders); Dent, supra note 35, at 898-
901 (arguing that the current system of governance is inadequate to protect shareholders).
181. See Conard, supra note 179, at 131 (noting the possibility that individual share-
holders would become active in corporate governance was reduced as the potential power
of institutional shareholders grew); see also BOARD OF GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS.
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS: FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES YEAR-END, 1961-84
at 35-36 (1985). While institutional ownership of equities increased from eleven percent to
twenty-nine percent from 1961-84, "household" ownership decreased from eighty-six per-
cent in 1961 to sixty-six percent in 1984. See id.
182. See Conard, supra note 179, at 135 (noting that "investor capitalism" is a means of
"restoring primacy to the interests of the suppliers of capital" and that it operates "ac-
cording to the traditional justifications of capitalism"); see also Dye & Hair, supra note 81,
at *385 (noting that the concentrated presence of institutional investors has dramatically
changed the structure of shareholder voting and thus, the system must be reevaluated);
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1987) (arguing that institutional investors have the power potentially to create a
system whereby management would be held accountable to shareholders); Vanecko, supra
note 1, at 377 (noting that there is a broad consensus "that institutional investors should
play a greater role in corporate governance").
183. See Vanecko, supra note 1, at 379 (explaining "the rise of the institutional inves-
tor has led to a reexamination of the structure of corporate goverance"); see also Letsou,
supra note 19, at 774-99 (arguing that traditional justifications such as the costs of share-
holder activism, safeguarding the economic function of the corporation, and the potential
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The influential role institutional investors possess is based on the real-
ity that these investors have a greater incentive to participate in corpo-
rate governance, due to concentrated ownership, than do individual
shareholders. 84 Unlike individual shareholders, these institutional inves-
tors have the resources and the inclination to participate actively in cor-
porate governance.185
As a result of modern resources, all shareholders are increasingly call-
ing for shareholder activism in corporate governance."' Moreover, in the
wake of the emergence of the institutional investor, the number of
shareholder proposals relating to corporate governance has increased.
87
At the same time, these proposals are receiving increased support from
fellow shareholders. 188
Due to the current rules and regulations, individual and institutional
investors' capacity to participate in corporate governance is diminished.
An atmosphere of management dominance is created by the rules and
exceptions governing for shareholder proposals, especially the ordinary
business exception. 89
Cracker Barrel's elimination of shareholder participation regarding
important social policies is another step in the wrong direction. The de-
cision separates further the duties of ownership and control, instead of
problems of collective shareholder activism, are no longer sufficient to outweigh the bene-
fits of shareholder activism in corporate governance).
184. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453-59 (1991) (noting that institutional investors
with concentrated holdings do not have the communication problems of individual share-
holders); see also Vanecko, supra note 1, at 381 (noting that institutional shareholders
have the economic incentive, due to their concentrated holdings, and the power to engage
in the process of corporate governance).
185. See Goforth, supra note 171, at 404-06 (stating that this change in structure and
resources is yet another reason why the traditional barriers and justifications to share-
holder participation are no longer valid).
186. See Goforth, supra note 171, at 408 (stating that with the evolution of the institu-
tional shareholder, it is "no longer accurate to depict the typical stockholder as a com-
pletely passive investor waiting for dividends to roll in"); see also Vanecko, supra note 1,
at 378-79 (noting the increasing call for shareholder participation).
187. See Barnard, supra note 113, at 1137 (stating that matters of corporate govern-
ance have become a popular focus of shareholder proposals).
188. See id. (stating that there is an increased number of proposals from shareholders
relating to matters of corporate governance that previously received minimal attention);
see also BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 20, § 13.10[1], at 13-74 (noting that Cal-
PERS, a major institutional investor, submitted twenty-eight proposals, during a three
year period, ten of which were supported by other institutional investors and "six [which]
were voluntarily withdrawn after [successful] negotiations with the [corporation]").
189. See Goforth, supra note 171, at 399-400 (noting that the procedural and substan-
tive "requirements for shareholder proposals tip the balance in favor of management").
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unifying them as is needed to ensure a system of corporate democracy.19°
One commentator has suggested that the separation of ownership and
control stems exclusively from management's control over the system of
proxy voting. 9 Giving shareholders control of this system would remedy
many other problems of corporate governance.9 The Commission,
however, has viewed this position as somewhat of a misnomer as evi-
denced by its decision in Cracker Barrel. Instead of trying to unify the
systems of ownership and control, the Commission has again diminished
the role of shareholders by making it more difficult for shareholders to
participate in the corporation's decision making process.1 93 The separa-
tion of ownership and control violates the principles of democracy.1 94
3. The SEC's Violation of the Spirit of the APA
The Cracker Barrel decision undermines corporate accountability to
shareholders, whether they are individuals or institutional investors.
Congress granted the Commission the authority to promulgate rules
''necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
the investors."' 96  The Commission exceeded that authority in the
190. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. See generally Dent, supra note 35, at
907 (arguing that "giving shareholders control of the proxy [voting] system" is the only
way to provide for a system of corporate accountability to shareholders).
191. See Dent, supra note 35, at 882 (asserting management's dominance over the
proxy system is seen as inevitable due to the inability of numerous shareholders to organ-
ize and coordinate voting efforts).
192. See id. at 882-83 (arguing that relinquishing control of the proxy system to a
committee of the corporation's largest shareholders would "unite ownership and control"
of the corporation and eliminate other problems, such as "tender offers, ineffective boards
of directors, skewed executive compensation, shareholder derivative suits, and de-
equitization").
193. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing how shareholder proposals
are the primary means of shareholder participation, thus limiting proposals that can be
submitted, furthers the gap between ownership and control). Shareholders are more lim-
ited now by the scope of what is a "proper subject" for shareholder consideration. See su-
pra Part II.B.1 (discussing the impact of the Cracker Barrel decision).
194. See Dent, supra note 35, at 893 (noting that in a democratic system, the decision
to spend "other people's money," should be made by elected officials). Investing a broad
spending power "in a self-selected corporate oligarchy, violates this principle" that these
decisions should be made by those who own the company or have been elected). See id.;
see also Eugene V. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate Management Re-
sponsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 64 (Edward S. Mason ed.,
1959) (asking whether democracy would "set any limit upon the directors' discretion in
spending corporate funds for what they decide is the public good").
195. See Frackman & Perry, supra note 175, at 3 (noting that "[t]he uncertainty re-
flected in the Cracker Barrel no-action letter undermines the utility of [the Shareholder
Proposal Rule]").
196. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994); see also supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (dis-
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
Cracker Barrel case. Not only did the Commission revise its "interpreta-
tion" of the ordinary business exception, by narrowing the approved
topics of shareholder proposals, it also did so without providing an op-
portunity for the public to participate. 7
As an administrative agency, the Commission is subject to the proce-
dures of the APA. 98 Although the court agreed with the Commission
that it technically had not violated the APA, 99 nonetheless, the SEC
violated the spirit of the APA because the purpose of the APA is to en-
sure the participation of all interested parties in rulemaking and agency
decisions." The Second Circuit agreed with the Commission that it had
not promulgated a rule; however, the Commission's "interpretation" sig-
nificantly changed the rights of the shareholders and thus, the Commis-
sion should have complied with the notice and comment procedures pre-
scribed by the APA.
The Commission is hardly "protecting investors" when it is further re-
stricting the participation of investors in corporate activities. 20' The deci-
sion in Cracker Barrel once again decreased shareholder accessibility to
proxy materials, thus decreasing shareholder participation in corporate202
governance. Although the Commission generally has endorsed a sys-
tem of corporate accountability, it has never endorsed formally the view
that shareholders should function as an instrument to ensure fair corpo-
203rate suffrage; this presents a major problem.
cussing the intent of Congress and the Commission in passing the legislation).
197. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the SEC
did not utilize the notice and comment procedures of the APA when it issued the new in-
terpretation of Rule 14a-(c)(7) in the Cracker Barrel no-action letter).
198. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (defining an "agency" subject to the APA, as "each
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to
review by another agency"); see also, Commercial Capital Corp. v. S.E.C., 360 F.2d 856,
857-58 (7th Cir. 1966) (stating that the APA applies to the SEC).
199. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
200. See H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 18 (1946) (stating that the purpose of the APA is
"to provide for publicity of information" and to ensure "procedures which adequately pro-
tect the private interests involved").
201. See Millon, supra note 2, at 225 (discussing the ongoing abrogation of the tradi-
tional notion of shareholder primacy, the basic premise of corporate law); see also Gocha,
supra note 16, at 412-13 (noting that the amendments the Commission made seem to re-
move power from the minority shareholders whose influence is already limited). See gen-
erally George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1, (1985) (providing a thorough discussion on the evolution of the Shareholder
Proposal Rule).
202. See generally Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 14, at 77,287. Share-
holder participation is directly decreased by limiting the scope of issues on which propos-
als may be submitted.
203. See Propp, supra note 1, at 115 (noting that "the SEC ha[s] not formally endorsed
[48:511
Reevaluating the Shareholder Proposal Rule
C. The Commission's Hazardous Shift in Focus
Scholars have severely criticized the Commission's evolving shift in its
policies and philosophy.l The Commission has become increasingly
concerned with the raising of capital at the cost of abandoning the con-
cept of corporate accountability to shareholders.20 ' The major problem
with the Commission's perceived lack of interest in corporate account-
ability is that corporate accountability is more pertinent to the "protec-
tion of investors" than the forming of capital within the corporation.
The Commission, therefore, may not be fulfilling its congressional man-
date; instead, it may be carving out a role for itself in the internal affairs
207
of corporations.
By its nature, the Commission has the unique ability to impact the in-
ternal affairs of corporations.20 This tremendous power should be used
to benefit investors, whose interest the Commission is statutorily obli-
gated to protect2 9 The Commission, however, as recently evidenced in
Cracker Barrel, is minimizing the impact that shareholders will have on
corporations and thus, decreasing overall corporate accountability.
The Cracker Barrel decision is the unfortunate and harmful result of a
the view that shareholder resolutions should or can function as a measure of democratic
control over corporate management").
204. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Administrative,
Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies-Their Influence on Corporate Inter-
nal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 173 & n.1 (1982) (citing critics that have argued
that the Commission has overstepped its boundaries by creating policies aimed at control-
ling the internal affairs of corporations).
205. See id. at 174 (arguing that the Commission has made a shift in policy in which the
theme of corporate accountability is practically non-existent). The author further asserts
that the Commission's policies substantially influence the internal affairs of corporations.
See id.
206. See id. (discussing the SEC's change in focus and the problems with this shift in
light of the Commission's congressional mandate).
207. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale behind the
promulgation of the Shareholder Proposal Rule); see also Steinberg, supra note 204, at
174, 184 (noting that "the Commission was created primarily to protect the investing pub-
lic, not to serve the interests of business").
208. See generally Steinberg, supra note 204, at 190-226 (discussing the numerous ways
that the Commission impacts the internal affairs of corporations); see also Palmiter, supra
note 10, at 880 (asserting that the responsibility for reform of the regulatory scheme, in-
cluding the Shareholder Proposal Rule, lies with the SEC).
209. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing the responsibility of the
Commission to protect investors).
210. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing how shareholder proposals
are the primary tools for shareholders to participate in corporate governance); see also
Vanecko, supra note 1, at 377 (noting that institutional shareholders should play a greater
role in corporate governance to insure that management will run companies to benefit
shareholders).
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well-intentioned rule that has withstood many damaging revisions. Since
its inception, the Shareholder Proposal Rule has been inefficient and un-
successful in obtaining the goals of Congress.21' The Rule was enacted to
ensure that shareholders could enforce their rights as owners of corpora-
tions to control important decisions. Congress intended to provide an
213opportunity for shareholders to question the actions of management.
The Rule also was envisioned as a mechanism by which the shareholder
could keep his stock and attempt to have an impact, rather than sell his
stock when dissatisfied with the management.214  Today, however, the
Rule does little to ensure shareholder participation as "owners" in the
corporate system of governance.2" The exceptions that provide for the
exclusion of proposals, especially the "ordinary business exception,"
have proved fatal to the effectiveness of the Rule.2 6 The reasons for its
failure are numerous, but as one judge noted, "[t]he term 'ordinary busi-
ness operations' is neither self-explanatory nor easy to explain.,
217
Although the Commission has acknowledged the need for enhanced
corporate accountability to investors, it has been reluctant to enact
211. See generally Gocha, supra note 16, at 440 (concluding that the evolution of Rule
14a-8 has been to restrict shareholder access).
212. See supra note 3-8 and accompanying text (discussing the intent behind the
Shareholder Proposal Rule).
213. See Schwartz and Weiss, supra note 6, at 641 (noting that shareholders have used
the Rule to hold management accountable for various actions); see also STAFF REPORT,
supra note 30, at 157 (summarizing a comment letter the Commission received which
stated that Rule 14a-8 provided an effective means for shareholders to compel manage-
ment to discuss matters that are important to shareholders and reasonably related to the
corporation's activities).
214. See Schwartz & Weiss, supra note 6, at 642. The Shareholder Proposal Rule is an
alternative approach to the "Wall Street Rule," which provides that shareholders who are
not satisfied with the corporation should sell their stock and reinvest. See id. This alterna-
tive was welcome, because the "Wall Street Rule" does not provide an adequate mecha-
nism to deal with specific issues that shareholders would like to redress. See id.
215. See Palmiter, supra note 10, at 886. Palmiter asserts that the Shareholder Pro-
posal Rule does not "create an open forum for shareholder communications. Rule 14a-8
imposes on shareholders strict procedural rules of access and gives management a daunt-
ing array of reasons, many content-based, to exclude a shareholder proposal." Id. See
generally Goforth, supra note 171, at 380-430 (citing reasons and examples for the failure
of the Shareholder Proposal Rule to increase shareholder participation in corporate gov-
ernance).
216. See Address by SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth before the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, reprinted in [1980-83 Transfer Binder] MUT. FUNDS GUIDE
(CCH) 11,348 (Dec. 11, 1981) (stating that only two shareholder proposals not supported
by management have ever been approved by shareholders as of that date).
217. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Dole Food Co., 795 F. Supp. 95,
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 969 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1992).
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measures to accomplish this goal."' The Commission's past decisions
and shifts in policies have served to undermine the system of corporate
accountability."' In the Staff Report issued by the SEC, the Commission
explicitly acknowledged that its framework of corporate accountability
needed strengthening,"O and focused on the role of shareholders in this
221process. Since the issuance of that report, there have not been any sub-
stantial changes in the rules favoring shareholder participation in corpo-
222rate governance. However, the SEC has recently taken steps to begin
221the process of remedying the situation.
III. THE NEED TO REEVALUATE THE ORDINARY BUSINESS EXCEPTION
IN THE ERA OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
There is no doubt that the Shareholder Proposal Rule, and especially
the ordinary business exception, need to be reformed.224 The current
Rule and the limitations on shareholders are unreasonable in the quest
to create the "shareholder-management balance" that has been envi-
sioned.222 Therefore, advocates for change state "that the SEC [must]
expand, or at least maintain, shareholder access to management prox-
ies." 226
As a result, many proposals to revise the Rule have been advanced.2
218. See Protection of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2561 Before the
Subcomm. On Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing and urban Affairs,
96th Cong., 2d. Sess, 33-67 (1980) (Commission Chairman Williams, recognizing the need
for corporate accountability to shareholders, expressed his "severe reservations about the
wisdom of legislation designed to regulate the corporate boardroom").
219. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
220. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 156, 205-08 (recognizing the problems that
have been encountered when implementing the Shareholder Proposal Rule and the need
to make changes to the Rule).
221. See id. at 156-59, 164 (discussing the role of the shareholder in corporate account-
ability and the need for changes to the Shareholder Proposal Rule).
222. The 1983 amendments were the last substantive amendments to the Shareholder
Proposal Rule, however, the 1976 amendment was the last amendment to the ordinary
business exception. See DeCapo, supra note 42, at 139-42 (discussing the evolution of the
Shareholder Proposal Rule).
223. See infra notes 248-56 and accompanying text (discussing the new Shareholder
Proposal Rule).
224. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (discussing the need for reevalu-
ation of the Rule).
225. See Harnisch, supra note 67, at 441 (arguing that the 1983 amendments cannot
maintain the delicate "shareholder-management balance" set by the 1976 amendments).
226. Id. at 441 (arguing that in light of the growing political and social influence of
American corporations in world affairs, it is imperative for the Commission to expand or
at least maintain the level of shareholder access to proxy materials).
227. See Jonathan E. Gottlieb, Regulation of Shareholder Proposals-Recent Devel-
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With any revision, however, there is a tradeoff."' The challenge in revis-
opments and Some Suggestions for Reform, 7 INSIGHTS 25, 28-29 (1993) (noting the likeli-
hood that the Commission will change its treatment of shareholder proposals). The
author advances six alternative approaches to the Shareholder Proposal Rule: (1) allowing
the Commission to "reassess its major interpretations after each proxy season and ... issue
an interpretive release announcing any major new interpretations"; (2) amending Rule
14a-8(c)(7) adopting "broad principles and specific factors for determining if a share-
holder proposal involves ordinary business"; (3) "amend[ing] Rule 14a-8(c) to permit an
issuer to omit any proposal that is primarily intended to promote social or political
causes;" (4) discontinuing the process of no-action letters; (5) "reduc[ing] the standards in
Rule 14a-8 to a minimum and permit[ting] issuers to establish additional limitations in
their by-laws;" (6) "replac[ing] the substantive requirements of Rule 14a-8 with an arbi-
trary rule that requires issuers to include no more than a fixed number of proposals in
their proxy statements each year." Id.; see also Dye & Hair, supra note 81, at *364-67
(summarizing the numerous approaches taken by shareholders to effectuate corporate ac-
countability); Neuhauser, supra note 62, at 221 (advocating an increase in shareholder
communication as a solution "for improving corporate responsiveness, accountability and
responsibility without imposing costs or undue burdens on registrants or others"). For a
good discussion and synopsis of proposed reforms, see Matheson & Olson, supra note 26,
at 158-68.
228. See Gottlieb, supra note 227, at 28-29 (identifying the drawbacks to each pro-
posed reform). With each option there will be some kind of tradeoff. See id. For exam-
ple, there may be uncertainty for issuers in denying access to proxy materials or toleration
by both issuers and shareholders because proxy statements may include proposals that
have "little interest or relevance to either group." Id. at 29. Some revisions would make it
"more difficult for shareholders with proposals that are directly tied to the business of the
issuer to get those proposals included in the proxy statement." Id. However, at the same
time, the costs involved in deciding whether to include or exclude a proposal would be re-
duced. See id. The investors and management simply need to decide how far they are
willing to bend. See id.; see also Matheson & Olson, supra note 26, at 1323 (stating the ar-
gument that shareholder and nonshareholder interests are divergent). The authors sug-
gest that
The challenge for corporate law is to facilitate the development of a corporate
structure that allows management the discretion to utilize its expertise on behalf
of shareholders, but at the same time establish safeguards in situations in which
management might utilize that discretion to favor itself at the expense of share-
holders.
Id. (quoting American Law Instutite, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS introductory note to part VI, at 519), (Proposed
Final Draft) (1992); see also American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Part III & liA intro. Note, (Pro-
posed Final Draft) (1992). The ALl recognized the dichotomy in positions and stated
"there are two highly important social needs regarding [publicly held] corporations[:] the
need to permit a corporation to be highly flexible in structuring its operational manage-
ment [and] the need for processes that ensure managerial accountability to shareholders."
Id.; see also Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life
and Corporate Law, 68 TEx. L. REV. 865, 879-80 (1990). Professor Lyman argues that
there are two "strands" of corporate law: shareholder welfare and management discretion.
See id. at 879. He advocates that the power of management should be broad enough to
allow management to be creative and flexible, but not at the cost of shareholder welfare.
See id. at 880. He argues that each can "check, if not negate and overwhelm, the other."
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ing the Rule and its exception is to work efficiently and to satisfy all par-
ties involved.229 The main factor to be considered in revising the Rule is
the increased presence of institutional investors in the corporate struc-
ture. 3° Today, however, the Commission is in a unique position to effec-
tuate the Rules needed to ensure shareholder participation and corpo-
rate accountability and to solidify the corporate landscape that the 1933
and 1934 Acts mutually envisioned.
The need for change in the Rule and the changing structure of the cor-
porate shareholder also calls for a rule and exceptions that are narrowly
defined. The SEC has examined further the idea that the ordinary busi-
ness exception should set forth broad principles of what constitutes ordi-
232
nary business. Advocates of this approach argue that at the very least,
it would reduce uncertainty and the Commission's appearance of arbi-
trariness in regulating shareholder proposals would be reduced.233 The
fact that shareholders are important to the corporate function provides
incentive for the Commission to strengthen, rather than weaken, the
shareholder proposal rule."'
A. The SEC Attempts to Revise Rule 14a-8(c)(7)
The Commission proposed a change to the Shareholder Proposal Rule
in September 1997.235 This proposal explicitly advocated changes to Rule
229. See Frackman & Perry, supra note 175, at 4 (discussing the inability to reach a
consensus on the substance of the reforms needed and the various substantive calls for re-
form of Rule 14a-8 from the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance, Commission-
ers of the SEC, the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, and shareholder activists).
230. See Vanecko, supra note 1, at 378 (noting that many scholars, business people,
pension fund managers, and union officials have called for a change to the Shareholder
Proposal Rule to encourage more institutional investor activism); supra note 117 and ac-
companying text (discussing the increased presence of institutional investors).
231. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing the unique attributes of
the SEC in regulation); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(a) (1994) (granting the Commission the power to take actions it deems "necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors"); H. R. REP. No. 73-
1383, at 14 (1934) (discussing the need for the 1934 Act during the time when the Commis-
sion was part of the Federal Trade Commission).
232. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (discussing the most recent pro-
posed rule); see also Gottlieb, supra note 227, at 29 (advocating that the Commission set
forth broad principles of what involves ordinary business to alleviate the uncertainty and
appearance of arbitrariness in the Commission's regulation of shareholder proposals).
233. See id. at 29.
234. See Harnisch, supra note 67, at 442 (asserting that shareholder proposals are
valuable to corporations in many respects). To ensure the continuity of these proposals,
the Commission will need to provide a meaningful right of access to the corporations'
proxy materials. See id.
235. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
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14a-8(c)(7).236 The proposal deals with the major points of contention of
investors including the Cracker Barrel policy,237 the lack of guidance the
language of the Rule provides, and the opportunity for shareholders to
,'override" a managerial decision to exclude a shareholder proposal from
the proxy materials. 9
This proposal was in part a product of the controversy surrounding theCrack  Ba rel • • 240
Cracker Barrel decision. In addition, the Commission noted that a
great number of proposals each year focus on corporate governance mat-ters and ocia polcy " 241
ters and social policy issues. As a result, in proposing these changes,
the Commission suggested that the current Rule was inadequate to deal
with shareholders' concerns.
The Commission proposed that Rule 14a-8 be revised into a question
and answer format, and specifically that Rule 14a-8(c)(7) be reworded to
include substantive examples of what might be excluded by its lan-
24guage.42 The proposal advocates a change in the "ordinary business ex-
ception" that would read:
Management functions: If the proposal relates to specific
business decisions normally left to the discretion of manage-
ment;
Note to paragraph (i)(7): Examples of such matters include
the way a newspaper formats its stock tables, whether a com-
pany charges an annual fee for use of its credit card, the wages a
company pays its non-executive employees, and the way a com-
pany operates its dividend reinvestment plan. For an invest-
ment company, such matters include the decision whether to in-
vest in the securities of a specific company."
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed Sept. 26,
1997).
236. See id. at 50,688-689 (discussing the proposed changes to Rule 14a-8(c)(7)).
237. See id. at 50,688.
238. See id. at 50,684-685 (discussing the proposal to revise the Rule 14a-8 in Plain
English and to "recast the Rule into a Question [and] Answer format").
239. See id. 50,690-691 (proposing an "override" mechanism whereby three percent of
the shareholders could override a company's decision to exclude a proposal).
240. See id. at 50,688. During the proxy season preceding this release, the Commission
"declined proponents' requests that [it] review three Division no-action responses impli-
cating the interpretation, and concerning companies' affirmative action policies and prac-
tices." Id. at 50,688 n.71.
241. See id. at 50,683 (stating that a significant number of proposals focus on matters
such as repealing laws establishing a classified board, eliminating pension plans for non-
employee directors, compensation matters, environmental matters, and the manufacture
of tobacco).
242. See id. at 50,684.
243. See id. at 50,704.
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The Commission has finally taken the long-needed, affirmative steps to
revise the Rule and the ordinary business exception to include substan-
tive definitions and rules of application. The Rule, as it now stands, is
amorphous and is left to administrative or judicial interpretation to de-
termine the substance of its confines." Shareholders need a substantive
guideline to follow so that they will not pursue a proposal topic that is ul-
timately determined to be beyond the confines of a "proper subject" for
shareholder consideration. A revision, such as the one the Commission
has proposed, including definite principles of application, will serve to
help investors and issuers alike by eliminating needless litigation14' and
lulls in the Commission's processes.246
Requiring the Commission to expound principles of what constitutes
an "ordinary business exception" reduces uncertainty in the interpreta-
tion of this exception. Furthermore, if the required principles are tai-
lored narrowly enough, the Commission would be forced to undertake
notice and comment procedures when attempting to change the interpre-
tation of a rule that would affect an individual's rights. 247
B. The Final Rule
In May 1998, the Commission issued the long awaited final rule
amending the Shareholder Proposal Rule. 248 The final Rule states that
the Commission is "adopting [its] proposal to reverse the Cracker Barrel
position., 249 The Commission notes that this proposal was overwhelm-
ingly supported and adopted by the Commission due to the "better un-
derstanding [it has gained] of the depth of interest among shareholders in
having an opportunity to express their views to company management on
employment-related proposals that raise sufficiently significant social
policy issues., 250 This Rule, therefore, reverses the Commission's provi-
244. See Shareholder Proposal Rule, 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1998). There is a no-
ticeable absence of definitions in the Rule. Thus, the definitions are left up to judicial con-
struction.
245. A good example of needless litigation is the NYCERS litigation regarding
Cracker Barrel. Had the Commission defined what constituted ordinary business or a
"substantial policy issue" this case never would have had to be litigated.
246. For example, the Commission terminated the issuance of no-action letters pend-
ing the outcome of the Cracker Barrel case.
247. See supra notes 147-48, 149 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements
of the APA).
248. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
249. Id. at 29,108.
250. Id. Nearly all the comments the shareholder community submitted supported the
reversal of the Cracker Barrel position, while members of the corporate community did
1999]
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sions relating to shareholder proposals regarding employment-based
policies, however, it does not affect other areas of shareholder propos-
als. 251
The Commission also has adopted the suggestion to reformat the Rule
into a question and answer format to facilitate investors' and manage-
ments' understanding of the Rule.2 2 The Commission, however, declined
to adopt the proposal to list illustrative examples of what would consti-
tute ordinary business, due to the fear that the list may be read as exclu-
sive as to what may be included as a proposal or may be seen as an inter-
pretive change.2" The Commission recognizes that "the phrase 'ordinary
business' . . . [is] a term-Of-art [sic] in the proxy area" which the courts
254have developed over the years.
The Commission also has decided to adopt the proposal increasing the
value of a company's shares that a shareholder must own to submit a
proposal from $1,000 to $2,000.25 This amendment is an adjustment for
inflation, and there was little opposition to the amendment, although
some commenters did not believe that the increase was enough to be
"meaningful. ,256
The Commission has taken some valuable steps toward increasing
shareholder activism, at least with respect to employment-based propos-
als dealing with significant social issues.257 The Commission, however,
declined to adopt the proposed "override mechanism," which would
have allowed three percent of a company's shareholder ownership to
"override" management's decision to exclude a proposal from proxy ma-
terials.258 This amendment would have allowed institutional investors to
have a broader range of influence over corporate governance.219 The
not favor reversal of the position. The corporate community, however, further explained
that it would support the reversal "as part of a broader set of reforms.")
251. See id. The Commission states in the final Rule that "shareholders should bear in
mind that the Cracker Barrel position related only to employment-related proposals rais-
ing certain social policy issues. Reversal of the position does not affect the Division's
analysis of any other category of proposals under the exclusion, such as proposals on gen-
eral business operations." Id.
252. See id. at 29,106-107.
253. See id. at 29,107.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 29,111.
256. See id. at 29,111-12.
257. See supra notes 248-51 (discussing the limited scope of the final Rule.)
258. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018,63 Fed. Reg. at 29,113.
259. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the role of shareholder pro-
posals in corporate governance.) Thus, if shareholders can submit proposals on a broader
range of issues, they will have more influence over corporate governance.
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Commission's failure to adopt this amendment will have the effect of
limiting the role of institutional shareholders to the detriment of all
shareholders.
C. The Need For Expanded Reevaluation
The SEC has made strides in expanding the role of shareholders with
recent amendments, but these are only the first steps toward a much
needed change. Further revisions should be undertaken to ensure that
shareholders are afforded the role they deserve in the governance of the
corporation.
The revisions should focus on the rights and role of the institutional in-
vestor. Institutional investors have the resources and incentive to par-
ticipate to a greater degree in corporate governance than do individual
investors 6 The rules should reflect the reality that these investors are
more active in the system of shareholder proposals 61
One possible step that the Commission might evaluate is whether there
should be an entirely different rule for shareholders with larger holdings,
such as institutional investors, than there should be for shareholders with
smaller holdings. As it stands now, all shareholders holding one percent
or $2000 in "market value" of securities may include proposals in the
262proxy statement. Most institutional investors, however, possess much• • • 263
larger holdings than that required for proposal inclusion. Those inves-
tors willing to put more time and money into the corporation should ac-
cordingly be granted more access to the proxy materials of the corpora-
264tion. Institutional shareholders should be given more opportunity than
the "household" shareholder to control the direction of the corporation.
The Commission should set a higher threshold requirement which af-
fords those who qualify the opportunity to participate to a greater degree
in setting the policy of the corporation. The September 1997 proposed
260. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing the ability and desire of
institutional investors to become more active shareholders).
261. See supra notes 123-127 and accompanying text. These investors, contrary to the
popular stigma attached to institutional shareholders, are not irrational or focused on the
short-term gains of the corporation. See Dent, supra note 35, at 922-23 (stating that "sev-
eral prestigious investment banks have created" leverage buyouts, whereby institutions
become controlling shareholders which in turn "eliminates managers' obsession with quar-
terly earnings and the bad habits that it creates") (quoting Power Investors Call the Shots,
Bus. WK., June 20, 1998, at 126-27.
262. See Commodities and Securities Exchanges, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998).
263. See note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the size and holdings of today's
institutional investors).
264. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing the philosophy of insti-
tutional investors).
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rule reflected this consideration, and it is unfortunate that the Commis-
sion declined to include the "override" in the final Rule.
The Commission initially advocated the "override" mechanism,
whereby three percent of the share ownership could veto a company's
decision to exclude a proposal, under 14a-8(c)(7).26  The Commission
noted that this "mechanism would broaden the spectrum of proposals
that may be included in companies' proxy materials., 26 The "override"
mechanism provided that the submitting shareholder could include his or
her own shares in calculating the three percent necessary to override
268management's decision to exclude a shareholder proposal. The Com-
mission also realized that in allowing this inclusion, a proponent who
holds three percent of a company's outstanding stock could effect an
"override" by itself.2 69
The Commission, however, has not fully realized the need to afford in-
stitutional investors greater latitude in the realm of shareholder propos-
als, as evidenced by its decision not to include this amendment in the fi-
nal Rule. The Commission says little about the reasons why it declined
to adopt the mechanism, saying only that "[s]everal commenters opposed
the proposal. 2 71 In support of this statement, however, the Commission
merely included a footnote from a few companies stating that they were
"concerned that [the] proposal if adopted might be costly and disruptive
for investment companies." 27' Without any more explanation than this,
the SEC dismissed an amendment that would have had far reaching af-
fects in affording increased participation to shareholders. Releasing
more control to such investors would not create the problems that are
traditionally cited as justifications for limitations on shareholder partici-
265. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. 50,682, 50,682 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed
Sept. 26, 1997). The proposed rule advocates an "override" mechanism which would ef-
fectively give institutional investors more power over the proxy statements. See id.
266. See id. at 50,690-92 (noting that the current Rule does not provide for an "over-
ride" mechanism such as the one proposed).
267. Id. at 50,690 (noting that this mechanism allows shareholders to decide among
themselves which issues are sufficiently relevant and important to all shareholders).
268. See id.
269. See id. (stating that the Commission believes that three percent "strike[s] the
right balance" between establishing a high enough percentage to ensure that the proposal
is "sufficiently relevant" to the shareholders and a low enough percentage so that an over-
ride would not be completely "unattainable").
270. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,113 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
271. Id. at 29,113 n.82.
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pation in the proxy system. The limitations on shareholders are tradi-
tionally premised on the irrationality and procedural problems of indi-
vidual or collective shareholder activism, and therefore, are no longer
271
justified in the era of the institutional investor.
The Commission needs to reevaluate and restructure the Shareholder
Proposal Rule and the "ordinary business exception" to provide share-
holders more power over important corporate policies. Through Cracker
Barrel, the Commission decreased shareholders' already minimal amount
of corporate accountability. The Commission's interpretation, however,
is contrary to the principle that shareholders are the "true owners" of the
corporation; therefore, this interpretation needs to be reevaluated.274
The Commission explicitly reversed the Cracker Barrel policy with its
recent amendments to the Rule.275 As a result of the Commission's adop-
tion of these recent amendments regarding 14a-8(c)(7), "the fact that a
shareholder proposal concerning a company's employment policies and
practices for the general workforce is tied to a social issue will no longer
be viewed as removing the proposal from the realm of ordinary business
operations of the registrant., 276 Although the Commission argues that
the interpretation advanced in Cracker Barrel continues to have some
validity, a change in policy is warranted within the "broader package of
reforms."27
The impact of returning to a pre-Cracker Barrel policy will be to allow
more shareholder proposals, thus fostering greater corporate account-
ability to shareholders. This change, however, comes at a price. There
still is not a "brightline" test for inclusion or exclusion of proposals.278
The Commission will return to a system in which they evaluate the pro-
posals on a case-by-case basis.2 7 9 Thus, it may be possible that a situation
272. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (noting the increased activity in
shareholder proposals from institutional investors as compared to the number of share-
holder proposals individual investors submit).
273. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the philosophies and atti-
tudes of institutional investors as compared to individual investors who simply followed
the "Wall Street Rule").
274. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of separa-
tion of ownership and management).
275. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
39,093, 62 Fed. Reg. at 50,682 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed Sept.
26, 1997) (noting that a reversal of Cracker Barrel will make it easier for shareholders to
include proposals in proxy materials).
276. Id. at 50,688. This language speaks directly to the issue in Cracker Barrel.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
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similar to Cracker Barrel may occur in the future. Even in light of this
concern, the final Rule goes further than the Commission has ever gone
before to ensure corporate accountability to shareholders. The new
amendments to the Shareholder Proposal Rule are a step in the right di-
rection, but it should not be the end of the line.
IV. CONCLUSION
The need for reevaluation of the Shareholder Proposal Rule and the
"ordinary business exception" was widely recognized as evidenced by the
recent amendments to the Rule. The only agency that has the power to
effectuate a change in policy has remained relatively silent until recently.
The Commission has realized the need, in light of the present social cul-
ture, to reevaluate the role that shareholders should play in the govern-
ance of corporations.
The problems created by the divergence of ownership and control of a
corporation have been recognized ever since Berle and Means estab-
lished the principle in the 1930s. These problems, however, have never
been dealt with adequately or effectively. In the dawning era of the insti-
tutional investor it is imperative that these problems be solved defini-
tively. The prevalence and strength of institutional investors provides
the outlet that has been missing to release power over shareholder pro-
posals back to the investors. These rational, business-minded institu-
tional investors deserve rights as owners of the corporation to control the
important aspects of a corporation's business. Without relinquishing
power to institutional investor shareholders, there will be a further de-
cline in the level of corporate accountability that corporations will afford
to shareholders.
40,018, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see also
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093, 62
Fed. Reg. at 50, 688 (noting that a return to an analytical approach may continue to raise
difficult interpretive questions).
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